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THE LOST RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN “ALL”
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
ANDREA ROTH†
ABSTRACT
The Sixth Amendment states that “in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury.” Similarly, Article III mandates that the trial of “all
crimes, other than impeachment, shall be by jury.” Nonetheless, tens of
thousands of federal defendants each year are denied a jury in “petty”
cases with a potential sentence of six months or less. These cases can
carry significant consequences and involve not only regulatory crimes
but traditional crimes like theft, assault, and sexual abuse. This
apparently blatant contradiction of the U.S. Constitution’s text is
justified by the so-called “petty-offense exception,” originating in
nineteenth-century Supreme Court dictum, which cited the Foundingera practice of allowing certain offenses deemed “petty” by Parliament
or colonial charters to be summarily tried by a justice of the peace.
While a couple of commentators over the last century have criticized
this doctrine, it has never been fully litigated. Harnessing previously
unexplored historical and textual sources, this Article offers the most
comprehensive argument to date that the petty offense exception’s
existing rationales are untenable. Indeed, as the sources reveal,
controversial summary bench trials could just as naturally be read as
inspiration for the Framers’ conspicuous decision to guarantee a jury
in “all” criminal prosecutions. Ultimately, if one looks to text and
history to interpret the jury right, it must at the very least extend to
defendants formally charged by the U.S. Department of Justice in
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federal criminal court. The Article concludes by exploring the
implications of a jury right in federal petty cases, including the
importance of the right, implications for state defendants, and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
In my early days as a public defender in Washington, D.C., I
represented a man accused—falsely, I believed—of assault. The
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primary evidence against him was the testimony of a person of
questionable credibility whose memory was impaired by significant
drug use. Although the crime was labeled a “misdemeanor” rather than
a “felony,” the proceedings were as formal as any other criminal case
and the stakes were high. The United States Attorney’s Office
(“USAO”) prosecuted the case under the auspices of the Department
of Justice. Upon being convicted, my client was sentenced to 180 days
in jail. He lost his job, was separated from his family, had the crime
placed on his criminal record, and spent six months in a cell in the D.C.
jail, a place notorious for tuberculosis outbreaks, insect infestations,
allegations of staff abuse, and lack of access to medical care.1
Hearing these facts, a reader might be forgiven for assuming that
my client had the benefit of a jury trial before being sentenced to those
six months in jail. After all, the Sixth Amendment guarantees, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.”2 Similarly, Article III of the
Constitution declares, “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”3 No other provision in the
Constitution further limits these guarantees to particular criminal
offenses or cases. Instead, they conspicuously apply to all crimes and
criminal prosecutions.
And yet, courts around the country routinely deny jury trials in
criminal prosecutions where the defendant is charged with a “petty”
crime carrying a statutory maximum jail term of sixth months or less.
This practice has great significance. Federal prosecutors file over sixty
thousand petty misdemeanor charges each year,4 including charges
against political protesters (on both sides of the aisle),5 impaired

1. See generally Madeleine Carlisle, The Crisis at the D.C. Jail Began Decades Before Jan.
6 Defendants Started Raising Concerns, TIME (Jan. 8, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/6137882/
dc-jail-conditions-january-6 [https://perma.cc/HN7Z-VGYJ] (describing the conditions of confinement
in D.C. jail).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
4. See, e.g., U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017: U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES (2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2017 [https://pe
rma.cc/V9GN-2XNC] (noting over seventy thousand petty criminal charges filed in 2017); Mary
C. Warner, Note, The Trials and Tribulations of Petty Offenses in the Federal Courts, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 2417, 2417 (2004) (noting a similar trend in the early 2000s of sixty thousand to seventy
thousand federal petty misdemeanors filed annually).
5. See, e.g., Ryan Lucas, Review of Federal Charges in Portland Unrest Shows Most Are
Misdemeanors, NPR (Sept. 5, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/05/909245646/review-
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driving in national parks,6 illegal entry into the United States,7 and
physical assaults on Indian land.8 Meanwhile, state prosecutors in 2016
filed 13.2 million misdemeanor charges, including petty charges for
traditional crimes such as assault,9 theft,10 and sex abuse.11 Even petty
regulatory offenses, like driving without a license, are a primary means
by which people enter the criminal legal system or are exposed as
undocumented.12 Indeed, a subfield of “misdemeanors studies” now
exists that highlights the outsized effects of misdemeanors on the
justice system and on those accused.13 And make no mistake: all federal
of-federal-charges-in-portland-unrest-show-most-are-misdemeanors [https://perma.cc/JEL7-LY
ZG] (noting that more than 70 percent of charges in connection with the racial justice protests in
Portland were for misdemeanors); Roger Parloff, What Do – and Will – the Criminal Prosecutions
of the Jan. 6 Capitol Rioters Tell Us?, LAWFARE (Nov. 4, 2021, 10:41 AM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/what-do%E2%80%94and-will%E2%80%94-criminal-prosecutions-jan-6-capitolrioters-tell-us [https://perma.cc/8SNV-DC4R] (noting the “avalanche of petty-offense convictions”
among those protesters pleading guilty).
6. See 36 C.F.R. § 4.23 (2022) (making impaired driving in a national park a six month
federal misdemeanor); 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (making violations of § 4 punishable by the penalties in 18
U.S.C. § 1865, which in turn imposes a penalty of up to six months’ imprisonment).
7. See generally Amy F. Kimpel, Alienating Criminal Procedure (July 3, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting the tens of thousands of petty misdemeanor prosecutions for
illegal entry annually at the southern border).
8. See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (making misdemeanor violations of state
law on federal lands into a federal criminal offense); General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(extending federal criminal jurisdiction to Indian country).
9. D.C. CODE § 22-404 (2022) (simple assault; 180-day statutory maximum).
10. Id. § 22-3211 to -3212(b) (second-degree theft; 180 days).
11. Id. § 22-3006 (misdemeanor sex abuse; 180 days).
12. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1316–17, 1321, 1325–
26 (2012) (noting the high stakes for many defendants in being drawn into the criminal system for
the first time through a misdemeanor charge).
13. To be sure, a small handful of scholars have been theorizing about misdemeanors for
decades. See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979) (explaining
how low-level courts typically achieve goals of the criminal process through the accusation and
pretrial supervision process, rather than through adjudication and sentencing). But more recently,
a critical mass of scholars have focused on misdemeanors. See generally Jamelia N. Morgan,
Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 1637, 1641–44 (2021) (explaining the high
stakes of order-maintenance misdemeanor prosecutions for norm creation and enforcement);
Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971,
1014–18 (2020) (presenting a comprehensive empirical portrait of U.S. misdemeanor practice);
ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (arguing that low-level courts engage in
deliberate practices that simply manage populations, rather than providing assembly-line justice);
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018) (arguing that
misdemeanors are overprosecuted and come with few procedural protections); Eisha Jain,
Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953 (2018) (arguing that
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petty offenses, at the very least, are crimes and criminal prosecutions in
any modern sense; they are formally charged by a criminal prosecutor
from the USAO under the Department of Justice, brought in criminal
court, involve a possible conviction of a federal crime, and may involve
criminal punishment up to six months’ incarceration (not to mention
fines and possible collateral consequences, from deportation to sex
offender registration).14
In justifying this apparently blatant contradiction of the
Constitution’s text in petty cases, courts invoke the so-called “petty
offense exception,” a doctrine that interprets the right to jury as
inapplicable to crimes deemed petty by Congress or a state legislature.
This exception originated in Callan v. Wilson,15 a case involving a
serious federal conspiracy-to-commit-extortion charge in Washington,
D.C.16 The Court held that the defendant was entitled to a jury (and
that the jury right applied to the District), but it posited in dictum that
the result would have been different had the offense been petty.17 The
Court based this dictum on two premises: that the word “crime,” while
sometimes used broadly to mean a violation of “public law,” is also
sometimes used narrowly to mean a “serious or atrocious” offense18;
and that the Framers were aware of and thus presumably approved the
English and colonial practice of allowing justices of the peace to
summarily try, without a jury, offenses labeled as “petty” or

misdemeanors’ high stakes stem largely from collateral consequences that, unlike formal
penalties, do not lead to procedural protections); Irene Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64
UCLA L. REV. 738, 785–86 (2017) (arguing that overburdened public defender offices should not
put their most junior and inexperienced attorneys in misdemeanor court); John D. King, Beyond
“Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing
that the stakes and complexity of misdemeanor cases are high enough that they should trigger the
right to counsel); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1019 (2013) (explaining how the alleged right to counsel in misdemeanor cases
involving probation sentences, since Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), is not recognized in
practice); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011) (explaining the high stakes of misdemeanor
arrests and convictions, from deportation to sex offender registration to loss of public housing).
14. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 297–302 (listing various severe collateral
consequences of misdemeanors); Warner, supra note 4, at 2421 (noting Class B misdemeanors
that are petty but eligible for six months’ incarceration).
15. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
16. See id. at 555.
17. Id. at 556–57.
18. Id. at 549. While the Court did not explicitly cite Blackstone in defining “crime,” this
language tracks Blackstone’s phrasing verbatim. See infra Part II.A.
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“summary” by Parliament.19 Since Callan, the petty offense exception
has become entrenched in federal and state case law.20 It was buttressed
by a 1926 law review article coauthored by then-Harvard Law
Professor Felix Frankfurter and his student Thomas Corcoran, Petty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
which followed the Callan dictum in justifying the petty offense
exception based on Blackstone and historical summary jurisdiction
practices.21 Since 1970, when the Supreme Court drew the
petty/nonpetty line at offenses carrying over a six-month statutory
maximum sentence,22 defendants in both state and federal courts have
routinely been denied a jury for all offenses carrying a potential
sentence of six months or less.23
This doctrine not only appears to contradict the Constitution’s text
and originated in dictum, but it has since been treated as settled
without further litigation challenging it.24 Over the years, the
occasional commentator has lamented that this exception is ahistorical
and contradicts the Constitution’s text.25 But the last commentary
arguing against the exception was thirty years ago by Timothy Lynch
of the Cato Institute,26 before new historical research on summary
19. See Callan, 127 U.S. at 552–53.
20. See infra Part I.B. (explaining twentieth-century entrenchment of the doctrine).
21. See generally Felix Frankfurter & Thomas Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926) (“The profound reasons
for a popular share in the administration of criminal justice did not cover this extensive range of
petty offenses. Such is the verdict of the history that went into the Constitution.”).
22. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 4, at 2422 (noting that federal crimes below Class A do not
receive a jury trial); D.C. CODE § 16-705 (2022) (no jury trial for petty misdemeanors); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 779 (2012) (no jury trial for crimes punishable by six months or less); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-33-9 (2013) (same).
24. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (explaining that the Court recently
“reaffirmed the long-established view that so-called ‘petty offenses’ may be tried without a jury”
in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
25. See infra Section I.C (discussing the two main articles critiquing the exception); see also
infra note 208 (citing sources that mention the issue in passing).
26. See generally Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 7 (1994) (arguing, among other things, that the Framers of the Constitution sought to
abrogate the common-law petty offense doctrine). As this Article was nearing going to press, I
was made aware of J.D. King’s excellent article discussing the petty offense exception, Juries,
Democracies, and Petty Crime. King notes several reasons that the petty offense doctrine is
counter to the text (citing Lynch) and argues against the exception on fairness, legitimacy, and
administrability grounds as well. See John D. King, Juries, Democracy, and Petty Crime, 24 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 817, 818–22 (2022). In particular, he notes that abandoning the doctrine would
obviate the need for difficult, subjective inquiries into which nonincarcerative qualities or
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practices emerged27 and before the triumph of various forms of
textualism and originalism on the Supreme Court.28 Litigants appear to
have treated the exception as settled, focusing their arguments on why
their offense is serious rather than petty.29 Remarkably, nearly a
century after Frankfurter and Corcoran’s article, no challenge to the
petty offense exception has ever (to my knowledge) been fully
litigated.
This Article offers the most comprehensive argument to date,
based on previously unexplored historical sources and text-based
arguments, that the petty offense exception is untenable on its own
terms. It explains why Callan and Frankfurter misused selective quotes
from Blackstone,30 and it draws upon contemporaneous dictionaries,
commentaries, public usages, and court cases routinely describing
summarily tried petty offenses as criminal prosecutions. It also draws
upon pre-Founding and Founding era cases and commentaries to
explain why controversial English and colonial summary practices
could be just as easily read as the target of the Sixth Amendment’s
categorical language, rather than as a practice the Founders hoped to
continue.31 It also makes clear that, perhaps most obviously, the
modern ordinary and legal usage of “crime” and “criminal
prosecution” includes formally charged offenses in criminal court that
are prosecuted by the government and end in a criminal conviction and
punishment. And it harnesses the recent insights of constitutional law
scholars on the meaning of other constitutional provisions related to
crimes and criminal cases.32

consequences are sufficient to render an offense “serious.” Id. at 818–19. While King does not
present the text and history-based arguments I put forth here, the arguments in the two articles
are entirely complementary.
27. See infra notes 317–331 (citing recent histories of summary trials in England).
28. See William Haun, Tradition-Based Originalism and the Supreme Court, AM. ENTER.
INST. (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.aei.org/articles/tradition-based-originalism-and-the-supremecourt [https://perma.cc/S63K-4ECL] (discussing the ascendancy of textualism and originalism
since Justice Antonin Scalia’s 1986 entry on the Court and noting that these theories now
“predominate” on the Court and will give rise to new debates among textualists and originalists,
rather than debates about the virtues of these theories compared with purposivism).
29. See, e.g., infra note 207 (citing examples of Ninth Circuit post-Baldwin case law, in which
litigants argue only that their cases are not petty).
30. See infra Section II.C.
31. See infra Section II.B.
32. See infra Section II.B.
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In arguing against the petty offense exception, this Article does
not assume the correctness of a particular mode of constitutional
interpretation, such as textualism or originalism.33 Rather, it explains
why the doctrine’s ostensible justifications—its appeals to Blackstone,
dictionaries, and English and colonial practices that the Court assumed
the Framers intended to continue—are baseless. Starting from scratch
with the categorical phrases “all crimes” and “all criminal
prosecutions,” then, the question becomes how to interpret them.
Other scholars have ably made the purposivist case for a broader jury
right, based on the importance of the jury in ensuring fairness and
accuracy.34 These arguments are presumably buttressed, rather than
threatened, by the arguments made here. After all, even nontextualists
now routinely assume that the “text, where clear, governs”35 and are
quick to note where Founding-era clues point to a broad interpretation
of criminal defendants’ rights.36 At any rate, given the current Supreme

33. The definition and desirability of these theories are both the subject of volumes of
academic debate. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 269
(2020) (distinguishing between “formalistic textualism” and “flexible textualism” and arguing for
the former); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558
(2006) (noting the debate over the meaning and desirability of originalism and urging a “common
law originalism” that recognizes the Framers’ knowledge of the indeterminacy of, and controversy
surrounding, various common law approaches).
34. E.g., Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607, 647–50 (2013) (arguing for the extension of jury trials to juvenile cases
because of the stakes involved and the fundamental importance of the right, as reflected in
Duncan v. Louisiana); King, supra note 26 (arguing for extension of the jury right to all criminal
offenses on fairness, legitimacy, and administrability grounds).
35. Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of
Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018); see also James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2011) (“Progressive
academics, for their part, have largely accepted the importance of text and history in
constitutional interpretation.”); Justice Elena Kagan, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:29 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&t=513s [https://perma.cc/F7LY-78AM] (“[W]e’re all
textualists now.”); cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009)
(arguing that “we can all care about framers’ intentions, ratifiers’ understandings, and original
public meaning without being originalists”); Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1639, 1689–95 (2016) (arguing that judges are justifiably originalist in interpreting rules and
nonoriginalist in interpreting standards).
36. See generally, e.g., Laurent Sacharoff, The Broken Fourth Amendment Oath, 74 STAN.
L. REV. 603 (2022) (making an originalist argument for a personal-knowledge warrant oath
requirement and dismissing nonoriginalist critiques by noting that this argument restores, rather
than limits, personal liberties and relates to a clear guarantee); Erica J. Hashimoto, An Originalist
Argument for a Sixth Amendment Right to Competent Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1999 (2014)
(arguing, based on Treason Act of 1696, that the Framers intended a basic level of competence in
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Court’s penchant for text-based analyses and examinations of
Founding-era historical practices when interpreting the Sixth
Amendment,37 the continuing resilience of the petty offense exception,
which seems to fly in the face of the plain text, seems curious.
Ultimately, for those who would look to text and history, the jury
right must at a minimum include federal criminal cases in which
defendants are formally prosecuted by a United States Attorney and
subject to punishment. For those who do not view the text and history
as dispositive or even particularly relevant, there are weighty reasons
to interpret the jury right to include such cases. Other than perhaps a
bald pragmatist appeal to cost and efficiency concerns, no justification
appears to exist for treating the categorical language of Article III and
the Sixth Amendment as exempting any federal criminal prosecution,
whether or not Congress hopes to bypass the jury right by labeling the
crime petty.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains how the petty
offense exception began and became settled, its ostensible
justifications, and the limits of litigants’ and scholars’ challenges to the
exception. Part II explains the overwhelming case against the
exception in light of the Constitution’s plain text and contextual
evidence of its meaning, including an in-depth exploration of
Blackstone, English and colonial summary practices, and other
historical sources relied on by Frankfurter and Corcoran. Part III
explores the implications of recognizing a jury trial right in petty cases:
the surprisingly vast effects in federal court; the even greater effects on
state courts, unless the Court embraces “dual-track incorporation” of

defense attorneys, which would call Strickland’s prejudice prong into doubt); cf. Beth A. Colgan,
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 283 (2014) (“tak[ing] the Court at
its word” that Founding-era historical practices are relevant to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment but noting other historical evidence showing the Court’s fines doctrine is ahistorical).
37. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (turning first to the text of
the Confrontation Clause and then to its historical background to determine the meaning of
“witnesses against”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (deeming significant, in
deciding whether sentencing factors increasing punishment must be found by a jury, that “[a]ny
possible distinction between an ‘element’” and a “‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice
of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed” near the Founding); cf.
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–89 (2019) (looking to the text and history of the Excessive
Fines Clause to determine whether the right is sufficiently fundamental to be binding on states).
But see Stephanos Bibas, The Limits of Textualism in Interpreting the Confrontation Clause, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737, 741–42 (2014) (acknowledging that textualism and originalism do
not offer clear answers to the question of what is a “witness” for Confrontation Clause purposes
because “[i]t is not clear that there was a preexisting concept of what ‘confrontation’ meant in a
criminal trial that the Framers meant to freeze in amber”).
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the jury right; and the possible effects on the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel “in all criminal prosecutions.” The Article concludes by
explaining why the right might be meaningful, even in an age of plea
bargaining, and even amid recent critiques insisting that additional
procedural rights will not enhance substantive justice.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
This Part briefly describes how the Court has come to interpret
the jury right to apply only to nonpetty crimes, even as Article III
requires a jury for “all crimes” other than impeachment, and even as
the Sixth Amendment right applies to “all criminal prosecutions.” It
then explores the few critiques of the petty offense exception and
explains that nearly all modern litigation related to the jury right takes
the exception as given. It focuses on arguing that various
circumstances—such as aggregated sentences of multiple petty
charges—render a prosecution nonpetty.
A. The Exception’s Origin in Nineteenth Century Dictum
For most of the country’s first century, the question of whether a
defendant charged with a petty crime has a Sixth Amendment right to
jury did not arise. To be sure, before and after the Sixth Amendment’s
ratification, some U.S. cities had bustling municipal courts in which
justices of the peace decided cases involving noncriminal municipal
ordinance violations without a jury.38 But the Sixth Amendment did
not apply in these proceedings or to state criminal court proceedings;
in fact, the Supreme Court did not deem any federal constitutional
right binding on states until the late 1800s, well after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.39 The Court did not recognize the jury right
as binding on the states until Duncan v. Louisiana.40
Meanwhile, those few federal crimes with potential sentences of
six months or less appear to have been generally tried by jury until the
38. See Brief for Appellant at 8, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (No. 1318) (citing
state cases holding that municipal ordinance violations were not in criminal court).
39. Compare Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833)
(holding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause not binding on states), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538
(1884) (holding the right to indictment not binding on states), with Chi., Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (applying the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
to the state of Illinois).
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968).
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creation of the petty offense exception in 1888.41 These misdemeanors
generally required indictment by grand jury as well. Not until 1930 did
Congress start formally labeling certain offenses in the federal criminal
code petty and allowing them to be charged by information (a brief
charging document signed solely by the prosecution) rather than
indictment (a charging document resulting from a grand jury’s finding
of probable cause to proceed with the case).42 Even where Congress
may have had a compelling reason to fear local resistance to unpopular
federal policy, such as in prosecutions for the six-month misdemeanor
of impeding recovery of enslaved persons under the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850, it recognized the right to jury trial.43 Likewise, despite frequent
jury nullification in other federal laws meeting local resistance, such as
the fine-only prohibitions of Thomas Jefferson’s Embargo Laws44 and
the one-year misdemeanor for violations of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,45
Congress took no action to try to remove the right to jury in such cases.
Presumably, Congress would have pursued nonjury summary
proceedings in such cases if it viewed them as a possibility.
Even as a matter of state law, the petty crime jury trial issue arose
infrequently before the twentieth century. By the late 1800s, only two
states, Massachusetts and New York, appear to have allowed nonjury
trials by justices of the peace in criminal cases, both in cases of petty

41. See, e.g., Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1885) (noting that the defendant
was tried by jury for the six-month misdemeanor offense of bigamy by a man); Ex parte Snow,
120 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1887) (same); In re The Ethan Allen, 25 F. Cas. 1024, 1024–25 (C.C.D. Cal.
1868) (No. 15,059) (noting that a jury would determine guilt regarding a six-month federal
misdemeanor charge for having too many passengers on a vessel); cf. United States v. Thompson,
12 F. 245, 246 (D. Or. 1882) (noting that a trial against a ship captain for the six-month
misdemeanor of taking too many passengers on a vessel was “by the stipulation of the parties . . .
tried by the court without a jury”).
42. See An Act To Amend Section 335 of the Criminal Code, Pub. L. No. 71-548, ch. 15, 46
Stat. 1029, 1029–30 (1930) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 541) (adding the category of
“petty” offenses to Title 18’s “Criminal Code” and allowing charge by information or complaint).
43. E.g., Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Pub. L. No. 31-60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (repealed 1864)
(making impeding recovery a six-month misdemeanor); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 80–82 (1994) (discussing frequent jury
nullification in Fugitive Slave Act cases).
44. See Douglas Lamar Jones, ‘The Caprice of Juries’: The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian
Embargo in Massachusetts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 327 (1980) (noting the relatively high jury
acquittal rate in such cases, which were fine only).
45. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(making violation of the Civil Rights Act a one-year misdemeanor); Jonathan Bressler,
Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1181–88
(discussing southern juries’ resistance to Reconstruction Era federal civil rights laws).
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larceny.46 While the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Jones v.
Robbins47 held this practice constitutional under the state
constitution’s jury right provision, it did so only with the understanding
that defendants in Boston’s police courts (if they could afford it) had
an “unqualified and unfettered right of appeal” from the police court
“to a court sitting with a jury.”48 And while the New York Court for
the Correction of Errors in Murphy v. People49 also upheld a larceny
conviction by a justice of the peace, it did so while applying the unusual
wording of New York’s state constitution, which guaranteed a jury only
“in all cases in which it has been heretofore used.”50 Because parts of
colonial New York allowed bench trials in cases of petty larceny, the
Court deemed the practice constitutional. It noted, however, that the
practice was “lamentable” and suggested that it would violate the
broader federal jury right were that right applicable.51
The first person to argue before the Supreme Court that he was
denied a jury trial in a misdemeanor case was convicted not in state or
federal court, but in a hybrid of the two—the District of Columbia. In
1870, Congress created a “Police Court,” much like the Boston police
court at issue in Jones, to try “offenses against the United States
committed in the District not deemed capital or otherwise infamous
Crimes; that is to say, of all simple assaults and batteries and all other
misdemeanors not punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary;
and of all offenses against the laws and ordinances of the District.”52

46. See Brief for Appellant at 10–12, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (No. 1318). In
addition, at least one other state suggested, in dicta, that the regime of Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass.
(8 Gray) 329 (1857), allowing an appeal of a summary conviction to a jury, would satisfy its state
constitutional jury guarantee. State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 439, 445–46 (1869).
47. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
48. Id. at 334–35, 341. Notably, though, the Court vacated the conviction anyway, deeming
the crime “infamous” (because of the potential prison sentence it carried), which triggered a state
constitutional right to indictment by grand jury. Id. at 349–50.
49. Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 815 (N.Y. 1824).
50. Id. at 816 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 2).
51. Id. at 817–18 (calling the practice “lamentable” and, though quoting the broad federal
jury right language, noting that this applied “in the Federal Courts only”); see also Jackson ex
dem. Wood v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819, 819–20 (N.Y. 1824) (deeming a witness’s previous larceny
conviction constitutional, even though not tried by jury, but conceding that if the Sixth
Amendment applied to state proceedings, the conviction would be unconstitutional). In contrast,
the New York high court in a different case struck down a law allowing nonjury criminal
proceedings for failure to pay a liquor excise because the law was new and such a crime would
have required a common-law jury. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 487 (1856).
52. Brief for Appellant at 3, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (No. 1318).
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Those defendants tried in D.C. Police Court were charged by
information rather than indictment and tried by a judge rather than
jury,53 although defendants who could afford an appeal could demand
a federal trial by jury upon conviction in Police Court.54 Perhaps for
this reason, few defendants in the eighteen years between the Police
Court’s inception and Callan’s Supreme Court appeal challenged the
lack of a jury.
The first Police Court defendant to have his jury demand chosen
for review by the Supreme Court was James Callan, accused of
conspiring to extort money from a local musician and, upon his refusal
to pay, boycotting his musical assembly.55 Callan was convicted of
conspiracy to commit extortion and sentenced to a fine and thirty days
in jail.56 While three other D.C. defendants before Callan had
challenged in federal court the denial of their jury trial request, none
of these cases squarely addressed whether petty federal crimes could
be tried by a judge consistent with Article III and the Sixth
Amendment. In the first two cases, lower federal courts had refused to
recognize the Police Court’s jurisdiction over libel, reasoning that—
whatever the legal scope of the Police Court—the traditionally jurydemandable offense of libel was beyond it.57 In the third case, the D.C.
Supreme Court (the precursor to the District Court for the District of
Columbia)58 recognized the potential constitutional problem with
denying a jury to a Police Court defendant convicted of six petty
larcenies and sentenced to a three-year cumulative prison term, but it
declined to address the issue given that the practice had already gone
unchallenged for fourteen years.59

53. D.C. CODE ch. 56, § 25 (1889).
54. Id. ch. 35, § 35.
55. Callan, 127 U.S. at 541–42.
56. Id. at 540.
57. In re Dana, 6 F. Cas. 1140, 1142 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3554); United States v. Buell,
8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 502, 503–04 (1874) (recognizing that the Police Court lacked jurisdiction over
crimes like libel that carried potential jail time). But see id. (Humphreys, J., concurring) (opining
that the Police Court could try a case that did not “rise above any little simple offense”).
58. See U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the District of Potomac:
Legislative History, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/us-district-courts-districtcolumbia-and-district-potomac-legislative-history [https://perma.cc/E5HG-7HWZ] (chronicling
the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1863 and its eventual shift to the District Court).
59. See In re Fry, 14 D.C. (3 Mackey) 135, 136–38 (1884).
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Callan argued in his brief that he was entitled to a jury trial, citing
the three cases above.60 Anticipating that the government would
concede that conspiracy is a jury-demandable offense, Callan focused
his brief on arguing that the right to appeal to a jury (if one could afford
it) did not cure the violation and that the D.C. Police Court was
somehow not exempted from the jury right.61 He reviewed the handful
of state cases upholding bench trial convictions in municipal police
courts, explaining how each involved a state constitution that limited
the jury right to those crimes that had “heretofore” been jury
demandable or involved civil rather than criminal judgments.62
In response, the United States argued that Callan was not entitled
to a jury trial for two reasons: the Sixth Amendment jury right did not
apply to the District of Columbia63 and the right to a de novo jury on
appeal from the Police Court was sufficient to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment.64 As anticipated, the government declined to argue that
the defendant’s crime of conspiracy was not jury demandable, although
it included a passive nod in the last sentence of its brief to possible
limits on the jury right: “It is proper to call the attention of the court to
the view, supported by authority, that the guaranty of trial by jury has
never been understood to embrace petty offenses.”65 But the two cases
cited in the sentence were weak support for that argument. One, Byers
v. Commonwealth,66 involved the Pennsylvania state constitution,
which—unlike the Sixth Amendment—extended only to offenses that
“heretofore” (before the state constitution’s ratification) were jury
demandable.67 Relying on the prevalence of summary proceedings in
colonial Pennsylvania for offenses designated petty by Parliament, the
Byers court affirmed the conviction.68 The other, McGear v.
Woodruff,69 involved a private suit to recover a penalty for a municipal

60. Brief for Appellant at 7–9, Callan, 127 U.S. 540 (No. 1318).
61. Id. at 15–17.
62. Id. at 6–13.
63. Brief for Appellee at 5–10, Callan, 127 U.S. 540 (No. 1318).
64. Id. at 11–16.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862).
67. Brief of Appellant at 7, Callan, 127 U.S. 540 (No. 1318) (citing Byers, 42 Pa. 89 (holding
that a petty larceny conviction in a Philadelphia municipal bench trial was not unconstitutional
under this language)); PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 6.
68. Byers, 42 Pa. at 96–97.
69. McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N.J.L. 213 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1868).
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ordinance violation for obstructing a driveway.70 The court,
interpreting New Jersey’s constitutional provision that “the right of a
trial by jury shall remain inviolate,” deemed these words to cover only
those cases that were jury demandable before the state constitution’s
ratification.71 The court concluded that an “action of debt” to recover
a penalty for violation of the “by-laws of a municipal corporation” was
not jury demandable before the constitution’s ratification, ending the
matter.72 The court also noted that the case had not ended in a
“conviction.”73 Even these two cases, then, rested on state constitution
provisions that, unlike the Sixth Amendment, offered no categorical
right to jury for all crimes or criminal prosecutions.
In rejecting the government’s arguments and holding that Callan
was entitled to a jury trial, the Supreme Court held both that the jury
right applies to D.C. and that the right to appeal to a jury from a bench
trial conviction was insufficient to satisfy the jury right.74 Given the
government’s concession that a conspiracy charge was otherwise jury
demandable, the Court could have ended its opinion there. But it also
“concede[d]” in dictum that there may be some petty crimes beyond
the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s jury right.75
Reflecting the fact that the government did not argue or brief the
issue, the Court’s dictum was not well supported. First, the Court cited
as authority the same state cases relied on by the government that
involved state constitutions explicitly limiting jury trials to those cases
already jury demandable under the state laws in effect at ratification.76
Some of the cases cited by the Court, as Callan had noted,77 either

70. Id. at 214.
71. Id. at 216 (quoting N.J. CONST of 1844, art. I, § 7).
72. Id. at 217.
73. Id.
74. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550–52 (1888).
75. Id. at 555.
76. The Court explained:
According to many adjudged cases, arising under constitutions which declare,
generally, that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, there are certain minor
or petty offenses that may be proceeded against summarily, and without a jury; and, in
respect to other offenses, the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the right to a trial
by jury in an appellate court is accorded to the accused. Byers . . . affords an illustration
of the first of the above classes. . . . So, also, in New Jersey, where the constitution
guarantied that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,” . . . .
Id. at 552–53 (citation omitted) (quoting McGear, 33 N.J.L. at 216).
77. Brief of Appellant at 10, Callan, 127 U.S. 540 (No. 1318).
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conditioned their holdings on the right to appeal to a jury78 or involved
noncriminal violations of municipal bylaws.79 Curiously, the Court
cited, but offered no answer to, authority discussed in Callan’s brief on
the other side of the issue.80
Ultimately, the Court concluded “without further reference to
authorities” that resolution of the petty offense issue was unnecessary,
given that Callan’s offense “[did] not belong to that class. A conspiracy
such as [that] charged against him and his codefendants [was] by no
means a petty or trivial offense.”81 Even so, the Court expressed its
holding in language that, while unnecessary to the result, suggested a
clear petty offense exception to the jury right:
Except in that class or grade of offenses called “petty offenses,”
which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against
summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the
guaranty of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution,
conducted either in the name or by or under the authority of the
United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from
the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the
offense charged.82

This dictum was highly influential in the years to come.
B. The Twentieth-Century Entrenchment of the Exception
This Subsection explains how Callan’s dictum became solidified
without meaningful litigation on the petty offense issue and how a
questionably reasoned law review article, coauthored by future

78. Callan, 127 U.S. at 552–54 (citing Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 335, 342–43
(1857)); cf. id. (citing In re Glen, 54 Md. 572, 588 (1880), in which the defendant also had a right
to appeal to jury, although the court did not explicitly rely on that fact). But see State v. Conlin,
27 Vt. 318, 323 (1855) (cited in Callan and holding that “minor offences punishable with fine only,
or imprisonment in the county jail, for a brief and limited period, and having reference to the
internal police of the state,” may be tried by a judge, not jury).
79. Callan, 127 U.S. at 553; see also City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622, 630–31 (1874)
(relying on the violation being a municipal, not state, case, which allowed an appeal to a de novo
jury). But see Conlin, 27 Vt. at 323 (allowing bench trial for a concededly criminal violation
punished by fine for illegal selling liquor).
80. For example, it cited without discussion a New York federal judge’s determination that
a defendant could not be extradited to D.C. to face a nonjury trial for petty libel, even though he
had a right to appeal to a jury, because such an arrangement violated the jury right. Callan, 127
U.S. at 554 (citing In re Dana, 6 F. Cas. 1140, 1142 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3554)).
81. Id. at 555.
82. Id. at 557.
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Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, buttressed it. It then discusses
Justice Hugo Black’s impassioned resistance to the petty offense
exception in both the jury and right-to-counsel context over the
decades from the late 1930s until his death in 1971, and it theorizes why
Justice Black’s textualist views on the Sixth Amendment did not
prevail.
1. Affirming the Exception: Schick v. United States (1904). The
dictum in Callan would be repeated often over the next few decades,
solidifying the doctrine that petty offenses are beyond the scope of the
Sixth Amendment’s jury right.83 Even so, remarkably, in none of these
later cases did a party present and brief the argument that a petty
federal crime is still a “crime” and a “criminal prosecution” and should
thus be jury demandable under Article III and the Sixth Amendment.84
In some of these cases, the parties may have strategically chosen not to
83. See, e.g., Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 623–24 (1891) (citing Callan, 127 U.S. at 553)
(rejecting claims that a municipal ordinance was repealed or otherwise an unconstitutional
legislative delegation of authority, stating that the case could be tried by a judge); District of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72–74 (1930) (holding that the D.C. offense of reckless driving
endangering others was serious enough to warrant a jury trial and describing in dictum the pettyoffense exception of Callan as “settled”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146, 158 n.30 (1968)
(citing Callan, 127 U.S. at 557) (noting in dictum, in a case involving a two-year serious offense,
that incorporation of the jury right would not affect state petty offenses “if that [right] is
construed, as it has been, to permit the trial of petty crimes” by judge); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 210–11 (1968) (holding that a twenty-four-month contempt sentence triggered the jury trial
right and reaffirming the petty offense exception in dictum); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,
148, 152 (1969) (concluding petitioner’s three-year probationary sentence was petty and thus he
was not entitled to a jury trial); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970) (holding that
offenses under six months are petty); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–45
(1989) (holding that additional shaming and community service penalties for state DUI offenders
otherwise facing only six months’ incarceration did not render the offense serious for jury
purposes, where petitioner conceded that petty offenses would not trigger the right); Lewis v.
United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1996) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that multiple six-month
offenses were nonpetty in the aggregate, thus triggering the jury trial right, even though petitioner
conceded that individual petty offenses were not jury demandable).
84. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Natal, 139 U.S. 621 (Nos. 271–74); Brief for the City of
New Orleans, Defendant in Error, Natal, 139 U.S. 621 (Nos. 271–74); Brief for District of
Columbia, Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (No. 96); Brief for the Respondent, Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (No. 96); Brief
for Appellant, Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (No. 410); Brief of the State of New York as Amicus Curiae,
Duncan, 391 U.S. 145 (No. 410); Brief for Edward S. Bloom, Petitioner, Bloom, 391 U.S. 194 (No.
52); Brief for Respondent, State of Illinois, Bloom, 391 U.S. 194 (No. 52); Brief for the Petitioner,
Frank, 395 U.S. 147 (No. 200); Brief for the United States, Frank, 395 U.S. 147 (No. 200); Brief
for Appellant, Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (No. 188); Brief for the Appellee, Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (No.
188); Brief for the Petitioners, Blanton, 489 U.S. 538 (No. 87-1437); Brief for the Respondent,
Blanton, 489 U.S. 538 (No. 87-1437); Brief for the Petitioner, Lewis, 518 U.S. 322 (No. 95-6465);
Brief for the United States, Lewis, 518 U.S. 322 (No. 95-6465).
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argue the issue; in others, the parties likely assumed the issue was
decided. Perhaps the lack of litigation stemmed in part from poor
lawyering or the fact that a “plain text” approach to interpreting
statutes and the Constitution had not yet emerged.85 In any event, the
settling of this doctrine was not the result of further research or legal
discourse among parties briefing both sides of the issue.
Just sixteen years after Callan, in Schick v. United States,86 the
Court reaffirmed the petty offense exception in yet another case in
which doing so was not necessary to the result and in which no party
argued against the exception.87 Ironically, Callan’s author, the first
Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissented in Schick and tried
unsuccessfully to limit the very exception he helped create.88 Schick
and his codefendants were convicted of the federal crime of unlicensed
sale of margarine and sentenced to pay a fine. The defendants sought
and obtained a bench trial, presumably because their defenses were
technical arguments about the constitutionality of their arrest. Though
the parties focused their briefs on whether the statute was
constitutional, the Court asked for another round of briefing on
whether the defendants overstepped their rights by insisting on a bench
trial, on the grounds that if the crime were one that had to be tried by
jury, the bench trial may have deprived the Court of jurisdiction by
rendering the judgment of guilt illegitimate and thus unreviewable.89
In an unusual role reversal, the Schick defendants themselves
insisted their offenses were petty and thus did not merit a jury, a
strategic concession in support of their desire to have the Court
exercise jurisdiction and declare their arrest unconstitutional.90 Even
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
87. Id. at 68–69; see Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs in Error on Question of Jurisdiction at
8, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23); Supplemental Brief for the United States on the Question
of Jurisdiction with Additional Remarks Upon the Merits at 6, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23,
301).
88. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 80–82 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
90. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 5–6, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 222–
23). Coincidentally, the son of Justice Harlan (and the father of the second Justice Harlan), John
Maynard Harlan, wrote an intervening brief in Schick, arguing that defendants should lose their
arguments on the constitutionality of their arrest but raising a tax-related issue that affected his
client in an unrelated case. A Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 2, Cliff v. United States, 195 U.S. 159
(Nos. 1902-614, 1903-221) (on file with author). John Maynard Harlan’s brief explicitly noted it
was not arguing the jury waiver issue, id. at 23, but it spent two pages noting the Callan dictum,
written by his father. Id. at 23–25.
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so, they dedicated only four pages to whether their offenses were jury
demandable.91 The government, meanwhile, spent only three pages on
the jurisdiction issue, hedging its arguments on waiver by noting Callan
and a couple of cases that appeared to go the other way92 and spending
the bulk of its supplemental brief on the merits. Thus, the Schick Court
could have decided the waiver issue simply by accepting the parties’
concessions or by holding simply that the jury right is waivable because
“an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to
enjoy.”93
Instead of deciding the case on these grounds, the Schick Court
not only reached the petty offense issue but significantly expanded
upon Callan’s dictum. The Court cited a portion of Blackstone’s
Commentaries for the proposition that “misdemeanors” as a class are
different from “crimes.” Specifically, the Court acknowledged that
Blackstone defined both “crimes and misdemeanors” as “act[s]
committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law” and described them
as, “properly speaking, . . . mere[ly] synonymous terms.”94 But the
Court highlighted Blackstone’s subsequent observation that, in
“common usage,” the term “crime” denotes “offenses . . . of a deeper
and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less
consequence” are “‘misdemeanors’ only.”95
The Court’s selective use of this passage to express Blackstone’s
views on whether the terms “crimes” and “criminal prosecutions”
include crimes deemed petty by a legislature is misleading. As Part II
discusses in more detail, Blackstone elsewhere in the volume declared
that summary convictions for crimes deemed petty by Parliament were
unjust deviations from the common right to jury in criminal cases.96 To
rely largely on Blackstone to deny jury trials in criminal prosecutions
involving offenses deemed petty by Parliament would be ironic at best.

91. See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs in Error on Question of Jurisdiction at 7–11,
Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23).
92. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for the United States on the Question of Jurisdiction with
Additional Remarks Upon the Merits at 7–8, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23, 301) (noting cases
upholding the right to jury for petty crimes, distinguishing them from the municipal offenses
discussed in Callan, and noting that the practice of federal district courts was “to try all criminal
cases, whether felonies or misdemeanors, by jury”).
93. Schick, 195 U.S. at 72.
94. Id. at 69–70 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5).
95. Id.
96. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
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The Court’s reliance on Blackstone was not inspired by the
parties; neither Schick nor the government argued that misdemeanors
as a class were not crimes. On the contrary, the government explicitly
described Schick’s charge as a “criminal prosecution[]”97 and stated in
its supplemental brief that misdemeanors triable by jury at common
law require a jury under the Sixth Amendment.98 Given that the
requirement of a jury in “all Crimes” in Article III was restated as “all
criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth Amendment,99 any relevance of
Blackstone’s note of the colloquial use of “crime” to mean particularly
atrocious acts seems strained.
Indeed, the parties may well have recognized that treating
misdemeanors as noncriminal would prove far too much.100 After all,
there was no question that some misdemeanors were jury demandable;
a unanimous Court had held in Callan, for example, that James
Callan’s thirty-day conspiracy conviction and sentence without a jury
was unconstitutional.101 Moreover, if the Constitution’s many other
references to crimes were interpreted as applying only to felonies or
atrocious acts, then much of its language would be superfluous,
including the requirement that “a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime” be indicted by a grand jury.102 As far as I am aware, courts deny
no other constitutional criminal procedure right by virtue of a case
being a misdemeanor rather than a felony, except where the provision

97. Brief for the United States at 2, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 222–23) (noting that the “first
three cases,” including Schick and the cases involving two other criminal defendants, “were
criminal prosecutions by information”).
98. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 6, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 222–23).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amend. VI.
100. See infra Part II.
101. In fact, the Court has since held that all misdemeanors subject to over six months’
imprisonment are jury demandable. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1970).
102. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment’s requirement of an indictment
in capital and otherwise “infamous” crimes reflected the common law requirement of an
indictment in all capital and other felonies. See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885) (noting
that the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause “in effect, affirm[ed] the rule of the common law
upon the same subject, substituting only, for capital crimes or felonies, ‘a capital or otherwise
infamous crime,’ manifestly had in view that rule of the common law”). The broader term
“infamous” covers any crime carrying the punishment of prison time—typically, but not
necessarily, those designated “felonies” by a legislature. See, e.g., Mackin v. United States, 117
U.S. 348, 352–53 (1886) (“In most of the states and territories, by constitution or statute, . . . all
crimes, or at least statutory crimes, not capital, are classed as felonies or as misdemeanors,
accordingly as they are or are not punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or
penitentiary.”).
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explicitly so provides, such as the Indictment Clause’s limitation to
“infamous” crimes.103
The Schick Court’s other support for interpreting the jury right as
excluding petty offenses was its observation that the first draft of
Article III stated “the trial of all criminal offenses . . . shall be by jury,”
while the final version changed “criminal offenses” to “crimes.”104 In
the Court’s view, the “significance of this change” could not “be
misunderstood,” given Blackstone’s description of the “popular
understanding of the meaning of the word ‘crimes.’”105 This argument,
too, was not in the parties’ briefs.106 Nor was it accompanied by any
other reference to contemporaneous sources showing the Framers’
intent in changing criminal offenses to crimes.107 Nor did the Court
include an explanation of how the Sixth Amendment’s reference to a
jury in “all criminal prosecutions” affected this claim.108
In dissent, Justice Harlan—the very author of Callan—rejected
the suggestion that the Framers’ use of the term “crimes” purposely
excluded misdemeanors: “To say that ‘crimes’ means something
different from ‘criminal offenses’ is something that I cannot
comprehend. A crime is a criminal offense and a criminal offense is a
crime.”109 Justice Harlan also rejected the idea that misdemeanors were
somehow not crimes. He noted that the Sixth Amendment’s reference
to “all criminal prosecutions” is “clear and explicit,” leaving “no room
for interpretation.”110 In turn, in Justice Harlan’s view, it was “not to
be doubted” that Schick faced a “criminal prosecution,” in which “the
established rules governing the conduct of trials in criminal cases” must
apply. Indeed, he noted, “[i]t never occurred to the trial court” to see
Schick’s case as anything but criminal, given that it was charged by
“criminal information” and was tried “as if it were a criminal

103. U.S. CONST. amend V. See generally infra Part II.B (discussing other constitutional rights
applicable to crimes, such as the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, and how the Court
has interpreted them as applying broadly to all crimes except those explicitly exempted).
104. Schick, 195 U.S. at 70.
105. Id.
106. See generally Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs in Error on Question of Jurisdiction,
Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23); Supplemental Brief for the United States on the Question of
Jurisdiction with Additional Remarks Upon the Merits, Schick, 195 U.S. 65 (Nos. 221–23, 301).
107. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 70–72.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 78.
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prosecution.”111 Looking beyond Schick’s case, Justice Harlan
recognized that “crime[s]” must at least include “penal laws” that
“impos[e] punishment for an offense committed against the state, and
which, by the English and American Constitutions, the executive of the
state has the power to pardon.”112 The fact that Schick’s “crime against
the United States”113 was a misdemeanor did not make it any less a
crime, given that the “ordinary meaning” of the terms “all crimes” and
“all criminal prosecutions” suggested no exception for minor crimes.114
In Justice Harlan’s view, then, Schick’s so-called petty
misdemeanor not only triggered a right to jury, but it required a jury,
even over Schick’s objection.115 To be sure, Justice Harlan thought it
possible for Congress, like Parliament, to legislatively designate a
crime as summarily triable.116 In Justice Harlan’s view, that practice—
though admittedly a “stranger” to the common law—might justify
reading a petty offense exception into the Constitution.117 Even so, he
acknowledged the issue as unresolved, leaving for another day whether
a legislatively designated petty offense could be tried constitutionally
without a jury.118 He also left unexplained how the Sixth Amendment’s
and Article III’s categorical language could be squared with summary
conviction of crimes, even if legislatively authorized.
2. Frankfurter’s Article and Subsequent Cases Applying the
Exception. Twenty years after Schick, the petty offense exception
received a scholarly boost from a 1926 law review article cowritten by
then-Harvard Law professor Felix Frankfurter and his student (and
future Franklin Delano Roosevelt confidante) Thomas Corcoran, Petty

111. Id. at 74.
112. Id. at 77 (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 79; see also id. at 83 (“[T]here is no warrant to construe [Article III] as if it read,
‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment and in misdemeanors, shall be by jury.’”).
115. Id. at 80–81. Harlan concluded that because Congress had not labeled Schick’s crime
petty, it was jury demandable. Indeed, he concluded that Schick could not have waived a jury; in
his view, the question of “[c]rime or no crime, if the plea be not guilty, can be established in a
court of the United States only by the verdict of a jury.” Id. at 96.
116. Id. at 97.
117. Id. at 80.
118. Id. at 97 (“Nor is it necessary to express any final judgment upon the question whether
the particular crime here involved might, by statute, be placed in that class and tried without a
jury.”).
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Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury.119
The article came during the middle of Prohibition, when Volstead Act
prosecutions for liquor distribution were frequent in federal court.120
Taking as its starting point that the Constitution’s text should be
interpreted “by reference to the common law and to British institutions
as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted,”121 the
authors offered a more comprehensive version of the Court’s own
justification for the exception in Callan and Schick. The authors
acknowledged there was no petty offense exception to the jury right at
its beginnings, even as justices of the peace began to preside over “local
criminal courts” in fourteenth-century England.122 But it noted the
“nibbling away [of] the traditional procedure” rights with respect to
minor offenses as the number of cases requiring adjudication
increased.123 It cataloged the increasing use of summary jurisdiction by
Parliament to designate certain offenses—even ones punishable by
large fines, corporal punishment, and imprisonment—as chargeable by
information, often by a private party, and triable by justices of the
peace rather than a petit jury.124 It also showed how the colonies
adopted, to a lesser extent, these summary practices.125
Even so, Frankfurter and Corcoran acknowledged that summary
convictions were convictions for “crimes,”126 and that many summarily
tried offenses were “formal criminal prosecutions,” while others were
mere qui tam or “civil actions of debt” against offenders by a private
party or the state.127 The authors openly acknowledged their approach
was contrary to “a doctrinaire or merely textual interpretation of the[]
clauses” in the Constitution guaranteeing a jury.128 Rather than
defaulting to a plain-language interpretation, Frankfurter and
Corcoran suggested that such an interpretation would be unjustified

119. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 21.
120. See id. at 920 (mentioning the Volstead Act).
121. Id. at 921 (quoting Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09 (1925)).
122. Id. at 923.
123. Id. at 926.
124. Id. at 930–32.
125. Id. at 934–65 (examining the practice in colonial Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia).
126. Id. at 933 (emphasis added) (“Alongside of trial before the popular tribunal was trial by
magistrates. There were crimes and crimes. The great dividing line was the use of a jury.”).
127. Id. at 937 & n.91 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 967.
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absent further evidence in the record that the Framers intended what
they wrote. To the authors, the absence of any explicit talk among the
Framers at the conventions about petty offenses signaled the Framers’
intention to continue summary practices rather than to limit such
practices by using the categorical language “all crimes” and “all
criminal prosecutions.”129
The Supreme Court cited Frankfurter and Corcoran in the next
(and only) case after Schick in which the petty offense exception was
essential to the Court’s holding: District of Columbia v. Clawans.130 The
Clawans Court held that the D.C. Police Court offense of reselling
railway tickets without a license was petty and thus not jury
demandable.131 But as in Schick, the parties in Clawans did not brief or
otherwise argue for or against the petty offense exception.132 Instead,
the parties took the exception as settled.133 Clawans accordingly argued
that her offense was nonpetty given that D.C. had previously
recognized it by statute as jury demandable even when it was
punishable only by thirty days in jail, and she argued that subsequent
increases in the maximum penalty thereby proved that D.C. still
viewed the offense as serious.134 In one short paragraph, the Court
declared the petty offense exception was “settled” and referenced the
colonial practice where petty offenses were tried by “justices of the
peace in England, and by police magistrates . . . in the Colonies.”135
Because “Congress itself,” by labeling Clawans’s crime petty, “ha[d]
expressed its deliberate judgment that the punishment is not too great
to be summarily administered,” the crime did not merit a jury trial.136

129. Id. at 968–72. For example, the authors deemed significant that they “f[ou]nd not a trace
of belief . . . that jury trial covered ‘petty offenses,’” and assumed, in the absence of such evidence,
that the Framers must have intended the phrase “all criminal prosecutions” to mean “all nonpetty
criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 971–74.
130. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
131. Id. at 626–27.
132. See generally Brief for District of Columbia, Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (No. 103) (making
no mention of petty offense issue); Brief for Respondent, Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (No. 103) (same).
133. See Brief for District of Columbia, Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (No. 103); Brief for
Respondent, Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (No. 103).
134. See Brief for Respondent at 5–21, Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (No. 103), 1936 WL 40122, at
*5–21; see also Clawans v. District of Columbia, 84 F.2d 265, 267–68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (assuming
Schick controlled but holding that the charge was “serious”), aff’d, 300 U.S. 617.
135. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624.
136. Id. at 628.
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Justices James McReynolds and Pierce Butler dissented in
Clawans,137 insisting that because Clawan’s offense was indisputably a
“crime,” albeit a petty crime punishable by only ninety days in jail and
a $300 fine, it was “criminal within the Sixth Amendment.”138 The
dissent noted the incongruity of denying a jury trial in such a case while
recognizing a Seventh Amendment constitutional right to jury in all
civil common-law cases involving a disputed sum over twenty dollars.139
Ultimately, the dissent viewed Clawans’s case as “show[ing] the grave
danger to liberty when one accused must submit to the uncertain
judgment of a single magistrate.”140
The same year as Clawans, the Court, in Duke v. United States,141
addressed the constitutionality of a new congressional law designating
federal crimes petty when subject to six months or less incarceration
and allowing such petty crimes to be charged by information or
complaint rather than indictment.142 Notably, the Fourth Circuit below
had been “divided and in doubt”143 as to the law’s constitutionality,
given that the Fifth Amendment guarantees indictment by grand jury
in any “capital, or otherwise infamous crime.”144 While the Duke Court
held that petty misdemeanors are not “infamous” crimes for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment,145 the Court did not address whether such
offenses are “criminal prosecutions” for purposes of Sixth Amendment
rights. Indeed, the Court noted that legislation attempting to make
petty crimes triable by commissioners rather than juries had “failed.”146
Three years after Duke, in 1940, Congress finally successfully passed a

137. Justice Harlan remained on the Court until his death in 1911, seven years after Schick.
John Marshall Harlan, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (2022), https://www.britannica.com/biography/John
-Marshall-Harlan-United-States-jurist-1833-1911 [https://perma.cc/U23Z-EP6V].
138. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 633 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 633–34.
140. Id. at 634.
141. Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937).
142. Id. at 494–95 (describing new law and holding that petty misdemeanors were not
“infamous” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment Clause); see also FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7, 58(b)(1) (allowing misdemeanors to proceed without indictment and citing Duke in Rule 7
advisory committee notes).
143. Duke, 103 U.S. at 493 (quoting the Fourth Circuit’s certified question to the Court).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. See Duke, 301 U.S. at 495.
146. Id. at 494.
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law allowing federal offenses labeled petty to be tried summarily by
commissioners.147
3. The Path Not Taken: Justice Black’s “Literal” Interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury and Counsel. To be sure, the
Frankfurther and Corcoran article, coupled with the lack of challenges
to the petty offense exception over the last century, might lend an air
of legitimacy, even inevitability, to the exception. And yet, it is worth
noting that around the time Congress was statutorily cementing the
exception, the Supreme Court welcomed a new member who would
become the exception’s harshest critic, Justice Hugo Black.148 Justice
Black consistently wrote, in dissent after dissent, that the Sixth
Amendment’s application to “all criminal prosecutions” included petty
crimes. He made this argument not only in the jury context but also
with respect to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of “the assistance of
counsel” in all criminal prosecutions.149 Of course, as explained below,
the right to counsel is obviously a different right than the jury right,
with different underlying purposes. But Justice Black’s compelling
arguments that the Sixth Amendment’s categorical language applied
to petty offenses in the right-to-counsel context, and Congress’s open
concessions on this point in 1964 right-to-counsel legislation,150 should
raise concern that a petty offense exception makes equally little sense
with respect to the Sixth Amendment jury right.
Justice Black, a “confessed textualist-originalist,”151 viewed the
Sixth Amendment’s “all criminal prosecutions” language as obviously
categorical.152 But because the petty offense exception was already
147. See An Act To Confer Jurisdiction Upon Certain United States Commissioners To Try
Petty Offenses Committed on Federal Reservations, Pub. L. No. 76-817, 54 Stat. 1058 (1940). See
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(E)–(F) (noting that defendants accused of petty misdemeanors
are not entitled to trial by jury or before a district court).
148. See supra notes 141–147 and accompanying text (noting that Duke, decided in 1937,
upheld the right to proceed by information in misdemeanors and that Duke was followed in 1940
by an Act allowing trial of petty misdemeanors by commissioners). Justice Black joined the Court
in 1937. Brian P. Smentkowski, Hugo Black, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Hugo-L-Black [https://perma.cc/2B2R-NMCZ], (last updated Sept. 21, 2022).
149. See infra notes 154–163 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 164–166 and accompanying text.
151. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional
Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997, 2008 n.33 (2006).
152. See, e.g., Rules of Proc. for the Trials of Minor Offenses Before Magistrates, 51 F.R.D.
197, 209 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (“By its own terms, the [Sixth] Amendment makes no
exception for so-called ‘petty offenses.’”); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 76 (1970) (Black,
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settled law by 1937,153 Justice Black’s only chance to turn this view of
the Sixth Amendment into doctrine was in the context of the right to
counsel, not the right to jury. A year after joining the Court, he wrote
in Johnson v. Zerbst154 that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—
including appointed counsel for those who could not afford it—applied
in all federal criminal prosecutions.155 While Zerbst was a felony case,156
and thus did not directly present the question whether the right to
counsel applied in petty crimes as well, the United States’ brief not only
conceded, but strategically relied on, the assumption that the right
extended to petty offenses as well.157 State courts, meanwhile, routinely
interpreted (and still interpret) similar “all criminal prosecutions”
language in their state constitutions as including petty misdemeanors
for right-to-counsel purposes.158

J., concurring) (arguing that the jury right applies to “all criminal prosecutions,” not just serious
ones); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 391 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The
Constitution . . . requires a trial by jury for the crime of criminal contempt, as it does for all other
crimes.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938) (writing for the Court in holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in all federal criminal prosecutions).
153. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
154. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
155. Id. at 462–63.
156. Id. at 459–60.
157. The United States argued in its Zerbst brief that Johnson had waived his right to counsel
(in a felony case), and it cited Schick v. United States (involving a federal misdemeanor deemed
petty for jury trial purposes) for the proposition that the “constitutional privilege” of the right to
counsel can be waived in either a petty or felony case. Brief for the United States at 10–11,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (No. 699), 1938 WL 63891, at *10–11. The premise
underlying the government’s waiver argument—that the right to counsel applies in petty cases
like Schick—was not treated as controversial in Zerbst. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 465; see also Evans
v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 634, 638–41 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (applying Zerbst to one-year misdemeanor
for failure to pay child support).
158. See State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 272 (Iowa 2015) (collecting cases); see also Decker
v. State, 150 N.E. 74, 76 (Ohio 1925) (noting the Ohio Constitution, which provides for counsel
to appear “in every trial in every court,” includes misdemeanor prosecutions (quoting OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 10)); Bolkovac v. State, 98 N.E.2d 250, 252–53 (Ind. 1951) (observing the Indiana
Constitution provides for the right to counsel in “all criminal prosecutions” and makes no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors (quoting IND. CONST. art. I, § 13)); Hunter v.
State, 288 P.2d 425, 428 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) (noting the “all criminal prosecutions” language
under the Oklahoma Constitution and finding that “[n]o distinction is drawn between a felony or
misdemeanor” (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20)); In re Johnson, 398 P.2d 420, 422 (Cal. 1965)
(noting the California Constitution, which provides counsel “[i]n criminal prosecutions, in any
court whatever,” includes misdemeanors (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13)); Brown v. Multnomah
Cnty. Dist. Ct., 570 P.2d 52, 55 (Or. 1977) (en banc) (observing that “all criminal prosecutions” in
the Oregon Constitution includes all conduct that the legislature has defined as a criminal offense
(quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 11)).
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Congress, for its part, appeared to acknowledge that any petty
offense exception to the right to counsel would violate the plain text of
the Sixth Amendment. Although in codifying Zerbst the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 explicitly exempted petty offenses from its
statutorily guaranteed right to appointed counsel,159 the conference
report conceded both that the House version’s application to “all
criminal cases” would thereby “includ[e] petty offenses,” and that the
Sixth Amendment “is without doubt applicable to petty offenses.”160
Nonetheless, the Committee expressed hope that lawyers would be
provided in such offenses on a pro bono basis and that congressional
funding could be focused on more serious crimes.161
Justice Black would not accept Congress’s acknowledged
divergence from the Sixth Amendment’s plain text in the Criminal
Justice Act’s exclusion of petty crimes from the federally funded right
to counsel. In 1971, the year Justice Black died, he dissented from an
opinion approving new rules for federal magistrates that did not
provide for appointed counsel in petty cases,162 opining that, “[b]y its
own terms, the [Sixth] Amendment makes no exception for so-called
‘petty offenses.’”163
While two of Justice Black’s opportunities to promote his literal
reading of the Sixth Amendment were in the right-to-counsel context
where no petty offense exception had yet been established, he also
159. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 3006A(b), 78 Stat. 552, 552 (1964)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
160. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1709, at 7 (1964) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3000,
3002.
161. Id.; see also Amendments to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964: Hearing on S. 1461 Before
the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 328 (1969) (report of Dallin Oaks, Professor of L., Univ.
of Chi.) (“The framers of the [Criminal Justice] [A]ct did not doubt—although prominent courts
do—that the sixth amendment right-to-counsel guarantees applied to misdemeanors and petty
offenses as well as felonies. Rather, they excluded petty offenses as a matter of priority of
expenditures.”); cf. H.R. REP. NO. 88-864, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990,
2992 (“Subsection (a) of this new section of title 18 provides that in every criminal case arising
under the laws of the United States, the U.S. commissioner or the court must advise the
defendant . . . that counsel will be appointed . . . if he is financially unable to retain counsel.”
(emphasis added)).
162. See Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 301(c), 82 Stat. 1107, 1115–18 (1968)
(giving the newly created category of “magistrates” the power to try petty offenses); Rules of
Proc. for the Trials of Minor Offenses Before Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 197, 203 (1971) (noting that
in all petty offense cases, the magistrate shall “inform the defendant of his right to counsel” even
though rules for other cases said appointed counsel as well).
163. Rules of Proc. for the Trial of Minor Offenses Before Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. at 209
(Black, J., dissenting).
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wrote separately or joined opinions condemning the exception in jurytrial-related cases. His first chance to criticize the exception was in
Cheff v. Schnackenberg.164 Cheff—a corporate officer who violated a
Federal Trade Commission order—was sentenced to six months in
prison for contempt of the Seventh Circuit, while his codefendants
were merely punished by fines.165 Cheff argued that his sentence, under
the unusual circumstances of the case, showed that the offense was
nonpetty.166 The Court disagreed.167 In dissent, Justice William O.
Douglas (joined by Justice Black) argued that “[t]he Constitution . . .
requires a trial by jury for the crime of criminal contempt, as it does for
all other crimes.”168 Reflecting the fact that direct contempt before a
judge is a sui generis event involving a proceeding different from a
typical charge, trial, and sentencing,169 Justices Douglas and Black
entertained the possibility that a judge might have some ability to
enforce courtroom integrity through a nonjury direct contempt
conviction in the absence of a jail sentence.170 But they rejected the
Court’s distinction between petty and nonpetty criminal contempts.171
Justice Black’s most full-throated condemnation of the petty
offense exception to the jury right was in Baldwin v. New York,172 in
which the Court formally declared the petty/nonpetty line at six

164. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
165. Id. at 376–77.
166. See Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Cheff, 384 U.S. 373 (No. 67), 1966 WL 100456, at *22
(arguing that a six-month prison sentence for violating a Federal Trade Commission order,
imposed by a federal court of appeals, “is so substantial that it carries with it all of the odium
attached to a sentence of two or three years”).
167. See Cheff, 384 U.S. at 378–80.
168. Id. at 391 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
169. See generally Robert P. Wolf, Criminal Contempt and Trial by Jury, 8 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 76 (1966) (explaining the Court’s differential treatment of direct contempt). The United
States Court of Military Appeals has similarly observed:
There is sound cause to accord special status to contempt proceedings, and refuse
to characterize them as trials. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in every
Federal court. It is summary in nature, and is the primary instrument through which a
court safeguards its own authority. Thus, in their very essence, contempt proceedings
are sui generis. They possess none of the touchstones of a trial, as we know them. In
the case of a direct criminal contempt, there need not be indictment, nor jury, nor the
reception of evidence, nor opportunity extended to the defendant to be heard, nor the
entry of a formal judgment.
United States v. Sinigar, 20 C.M.R. 46, 53–54 (C.M.A. 1955) (citation omitted).
170. See Cheff at 392 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 392–94.
172. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).

ROTH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2022 1:44 PM

628

[Vol. 72:599

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

months.173 Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, argued that the
petty offense exception had, since its inception, violated the plain text
of the Constitution by treating the phrase “all crimes” as if it read “all
serious crimes.”174 Justice Black accused the plurality of further
deviating from the text by now “judicially amend[ing]” the phrase “all
crimes” with “all crimes in which punishment for more than six months
is authorized.”175 To Justice Black, this amounted to “judicial
mutilation of our written Constitution.”176 Because “[t]hose who wrote
and adopted our Constitution and Bill of Rights” had already “engaged
in all the balancing necessary” when “decid[ing] that the value of a jury
trial far outweighed its costs for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions,’” Justice Black viewed as illegitimate the Court’s own
weighing of the “advantages to the defendant against the
administrative inconvenience to the State” of a jury trial in “magically
concluding that the scale tips” at six months.177 To Justice Black,
Baldwin’s misdemeanor conviction for “jostling” was “a ‘crime’ in any
relevant sense of that word,” whatever the statutory maximum.178 Even
Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissenting from the Court’s grant of a
jury to Baldwin on grounds that state defendants had no right to a jury
in a one-year misdemeanor, acknowledged that the categorical
language of the Sixth Amendment and Article III would presumably
require a jury if the case were in federal, rather than state, court.179
Although Justice Black never convinced his colleagues to rethink
the petty offense exception, it is worth noting the Court came close to
adopting his categorical reading of the Sixth Amendment for right-tocounsel purposes a year after his death. The Court unanimously held
in Argersinger v. Hamlin180 that the right to appointed counsel applied
in petty state cases where the defendant receives a jail sentence.181
Notably, the state of Florida (the respondent in Argersinger) did not
argue that petty crimes are not criminal prosecutions. Rather, it argued
against a textualist approach to the Sixth Amendment, insisting that
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 69.
Id. at 75 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. (third alteration in original).
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76–77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 37.
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the “‘absolute right’ to counsel in all criminal prosecutions must be
qualified by practical exigencies,”182 and noting that the Court had
already abandoned a literal approach with respect to the jury right and
could thus do the same here.183 Although the Court agreed with
Argersinger that he deserved a lawyer, it relied narrowly on the fact
that Argersinger was sentenced to jail.184 The Court did not yet have
five votes to adopt Justice Black’s view and declare the right applicable
to literally “all criminal prosecutions.”
Although the Court seven years later in Scott v. Illinois185 squarely
rejected extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to “all
criminal prosecutions,” it did so only with a thin majority and over a
vigorous dissent.186 Scott was convicted of a nonpetty, jury-demandable
misdemeanor, but because he received no jail time as a sentence, the
trial court denied his request for appointed counsel.187 In arguing his
conviction violated the Sixth Amendment, Scott insisted that the right
to counsel covers “all criminal prosecutions” and cannot be trumped
by policy or efficiency concerns.188 Scott did not, however, offer a full
briefing of the meaning of “criminal prosecution.”189 In response, the
182. Brief for the Respondent at 10, Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25 (No. 70-5015), 1971 WL 126424,
at *10.
183. Id. at 12–13 (arguing that “criminal prosecutions” should have the same meaning for
jury and counsel).
184. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 51 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
185. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
186. Id. at 373–74 (5–4 decision); id. at 375–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 368–69 (majority opinion).
188. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (No. 17-1177), 1978 WL 206716, at
*8 (“[W]hatever the Court eventually may determine to be the outer reaches of the definition of
a ‘criminal prosecution’ for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, petitioner’s prosecution clearly
fits that definition since misdemeanor-theft has all of the many indicia of a traditional criminal
offense.”); id. at *12 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment “applies the right to counsel ‘in all
criminal prosecutions.’ It does not apply the right, as the State of Illinois would have it, ‘in all
criminal prosecutions except for misdemeanor prosecutions not resulting in imprisonment’”); id.
at *16 (“[T]he misdemeanor-theft prosecution of petitioner Scott is a ‘criminal prosecution’
within any reasonable construction of the Amendment’s language.”); see also Reply Brief for the
Petitioner, Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (No. 17-1177), 1978 WL 223555, at *7 (arguing that Illinois’s
position “makes the Sixth Amendment’s explicit application ‘in all criminal prosecutions’ totally
meaningless”).
189. Scott did argue that his theft was malum in se and thus bore all the hallmarks of a
traditional crime, Brief for the Petitioner, Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (No. 17-1177), 1978 WL 206716, at
*8, *16–18, and that any “reasonable construction” of the phrase “all criminal prosecutions”
includes misdemeanor prosecutions. Id. at *16–17. He also noted that the Argersinger Court
found “no historical support” for limiting the right to counsel to serious cases. Id. at *12. But he
did not otherwise engage sources such as dictionaries, other constitutional provisions’ use of
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state of Illinois, like Florida in Argersinger, did not claim that the
Framers intended the term criminal prosecutions exclude petty
offenses; rather, it focused on the impracticability of a literal reading
of, or “‘absolut[i]st’ position” toward, the text: the cost of juries and
lawyers and the fact that the Court had already deviated from the text
in establishing the petty offense exception to the jury right.190
In holding that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel
does not apply in cases where the defendant was not sentenced to jail
time,191 the Scott Court conspicuously avoided relying on the premise
that the Framers intended “all criminal prosecutions” mean only
certain crimes. Instead, it took a decidedly pragmatic approach to the
issue, reasoning that its previous departures from the text forgave
further departures if otherwise justified on pragmatic grounds. It first
noted, echoing the state’s brief, that the Court’s previous “decided
cases departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”192
For example, the Court reasoned, the Framers likely did not anticipate
a right to appointed counsel at all in drafting the Sixth Amendment,
and yet the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright193 had recognized such a
right.194 It then appeared to take what might even be described as an
anti-originalist approach, noting that to the extent the Framers
intended by the text to codify the English common-law right to counsel,
that right was not worth protecting because it “perversely gave less in
the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of
misdemeanors.”195 Finally, the Court reverted to pragmatic arguments,

“crime,” historical sources shedding light on the common or the Framers’ understanding of the
term “crime,” etc. See id. at *16–22.
190. Brief for the Respondent, Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (No. 17-1177), 1978 WL 206719, at *10–13
(arguing against an “absolute right” and that the jury right and right to counsel have in common
“their cost”); id. at *10 (“Neither the history of the Sixth Amendment nor the precedents of this
Court support the view that the burden imposed on the State cannot be considered in defining
the scope of a right.”).
191. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74.
192. Id. at 372.
193. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
194. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370–71 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339).
195. Id. at 372. Perhaps counterintuitively, the English right to counsel in felonies came long
after the right had been established in jury-demandable misdemeanors for reasons related to the
higher stakes for the Crown in felony acquittals and the legal fiction that the judge himself would
act as “counsel” to the accused in felony cases. See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT
TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 14 (2002) (“[T]he states had dramatically departed from the restrictive English
common law rule regarding retention of counsel in serious criminal prosecutions.”).
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noting that a literal approach to the Sixth Amendment, at least in state
court, would reach an untenably broad number of modern state
regulatory offenses.196
The Scott dissenters, to be sure, placed the text of the Sixth
Amendment front and center, emphasizing the “all” in “all criminal
prosecutions” and arguing that the Court’s opinion ignored the “plain
wording of the Sixth Amendment.”197 But even these statements were
more rhetorical flourish than a full-throated, text-based argument.
Moreover, these same Justices had arguably set the stage for Scott by
agreeing to write Argersinger in a way that emphasized actual
imprisonment rather than the categorical phrase “all criminal
prosecutions.”198 In short, the Scott dissenters were focused more on
fairness-based arguments for a broader right to counsel than on
resurrecting Justice Black’s critiques of the Court’s various attempts to
judicially amend the phrase “all criminal prosecutions.”
Although Scott is still good law,199 and Justice Black’s categorical
view of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been officially
rejected, it is worth noting that Scott was a state, not a federal, case.200
As a result, its pragmatic reasoning—which might well justify limiting
a right in state court where only those guarantees in the Bill of Rights
deemed sufficiently fundamental are binding under the doctrine of
selective incorporation201—seems out of place if applied to federal
court. As of this writing, the Court has still not squarely addressed
whether a federal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in federal misdemeanors where the defendant is not sentenced to jail

196. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372 (“The range of human conduct regulated by state criminal laws is
much broader than that of the federal criminal laws, particularly on the ‘petty’ offense part of the
spectrum. As a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to extrapolate
an already extended line . . . .”). At least some scholars begrudgingly agreed with the Scott
majority on this point. See, e.g., Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and
the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 78–80 (1979)
(noting the “doctrinally pure” alternative of providing counsel in literally “all criminal
prosecutions” but stating that this approach would likely be cost prohibitive and thus not
persuasive).
197. Scott, 440 U.S. 367, 375–76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
199. The Supreme Court has favorably cited Scott as recently as 2016. E.g., United States v.
Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 143 (2016).
200. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 368.
201. See infra notes 343–347 and accompanying text.
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time.202 Congress, for its part, seems to have assumed that Scott applies
in federal court; the rules of federal criminal procedure were amended
after Scott to explicitly allow federal judges to deny appointed counsel
in petty cases where the government declines to seek a jail sentence.203
Yet the federal courts following Scott have not grappled with the plain
text of the Sixth Amendment; rather, they simply reason that because
the Sixth Amendment has the same meaning in federal and state court,
Scott must apply in federal court as well.204
In sum, the “petty offense exception” began in nineteenth century
dictum in Callan v. Wilson, based on the Court’s misguided assumption
that the jury right in the U.S. Constitution should apply only to serious,
rather than petty, crimes. While the issue was never fully and fairly
litigated in or after Callan, the Court in future opinions treated the
matter as settled, over the occasional dissent. Meanwhile, the Court
partially, though not fully, imported the petty offense exception to the
right-to-counsel context, declining to adopt Justice Black’s literal
reading of the Sixth Amendment as applying to all crimes. In 2022,
federal defendants prosecuted by the Department of Justice for sixmonth misdemeanor crimes have no right to a jury, and no right to
counsel, when the government declines to seek a jail sentence.
C. Limited Critiques of the Exception
The staying power of such a thinly justified exception to the
Constitution’s plain text is surely explained in part by the lack of
challenges to the doctrine once Frankfurter and Corcoran and the
Court described it as “settled” in the early twentieth century.205
202. See, e.g., United States v. Tobey, No. 2:19-cr-00150, 2020 WL 1451590, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 25, 2020), aff’d, 845 F.App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 615 (2021) (noting
Ninth Circuit case law on the open question of whether Scott applies to federal defendants).
203. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(C) (requiring judges to apprise defendants of “the right
to request the appointment of counsel if the defendant is unable to retain counsel—unless the
charge is a petty offense for which the appointment of counsel is not required”); id. 58(a)(2) (“In
a case involving a petty offense for which no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed, the court
may follow any provision of these rules that is not inconsistent with this rule and that the court
considers appropriate.”).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 143 (2016) (assuming, in passing, that
Scott applies to both state and federal cases); United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 650, 654 (10th
Cir. 1991) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 374) (affirming the fine-only sentence of an indigent pro se
defendant charged with leaving property unattended in a national park); United States v. Doe,
743 F.2d 1033, 1038 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 373) (stating that “only offenses where
a sentence of imprisonment is imposed give the defendant a right to appointed counsel”).
205. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Remarkably, James Callan—of Callan v. Wilson—appears to still be
the only Supreme Court litigant to have fully briefed the issue. Given
that the petty-offense analysis in Callan was dictum, one might expect
at least some federal litigants to have urged trial or lower appellate
federal courts to grant them a jury trial.206 Nonetheless, to my
knowledge, the issue has not been raised.207
Legal commentators have also largely left the doctrine alone.
Aside from Frankfurter and Corcoran’s article, only two law review
articles have ever explored the purported textual and historical bases
of the doctrine in depth.208 The first was in 1959 by Chicago lawyer
George Kaye.209 Kaye focused on three arguments: (1) the sparse
constitutional debates about Article III and the Sixth Amendment
offer no evidence that the Framers intended to exempt offenses
deemed petty by Congress210; (2) because English and colonial
summary practices were part of the law of the land rather than

206. See, e.g., United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing dicta as
statements in a court opinion that are “not necessarily essential to the decision” (quoting Stover
v. Stover, 483 A.2d 783 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984))). Particularly where the issue was not disputed
by the parties and thus not “refined by the fires of adversary presentation,” id. at 293, litigants
would have a colorable argument that lower courts should not treat the issue as properly
adjudicated.
207. For example, the Ninth Circuit has never squarely held that a federal petty misdemeanor
is not a “criminal prosecution” for jury trial purposes in a case where the issue was disputed.
Instead, its cases (and the litigants therein) have simply taken the exception as a given and
determined whether the offense is petty or serious. See, e.g., United States v. Wallen, 874 F.3d
620, 625–26 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting appellant’s claim that killing a grizzly bear was a serious
offense because of $15,000 restitution and five-year probationary period); Hoffman v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 10, 492 F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting appellants’ arguments that $500 contempt fine was serious).
208. A few have mentioned how the doctrine contradicts the Constitution’s text but have not
otherwise analyzed the issue in depth. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Textualism on Trial: Article
III’s Jury Trial Provision, the “Petty Offense” Exception, and Other Departures from Clear
Constitutional Text, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (2013) (noting that the petty offense exception
violates “clear and concrete constitutional text without a workaround to provide cover,” thus
challenging scholar Mark Tushnet’s thesis that clear departures from text are always justified by
workarounds that still appear to be loyal to text); Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 520 (2009) (referring in passing to the petty offense
exception to the jury right as an example of the Court’s “textually inconsistent construction” of
the term “all criminal prosecutions”); Note, The Trial of Petty Offenses by Federal Magistrates:
Collision with Amendment VI, 1 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 66 (1971) (describing the petty offense
exception as “blatantly demonic” but offering little analysis on the jury issue).
209. See generally George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245
(1959). Justice Douglas cited Kaye’s article in his Cheff dissent. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
375, 391 n.10 (1966) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
210. See Kaye, supra note 209, at 260–67.
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exceptions to some generally applicable categorical jury right, they
offer no evidence that the new, generally applicable right in the
Constitution should be read as having an exception211; and (3) the
Constitution’s “all crimes” and “all criminal prosecutions” phrasing is
notably different from some state constitutions explicitly exempting
certain crimes.212
The second article critiquing the doctrine was by Timothy Lynch
of the Cato Institute in 1994.213 Lynch’s three primary arguments were:
(1) constitutional provisions guaranteeing individual rights against the
government should “enjoy a liberal construction” and evidence from
constitutional debates should not trump the plain text214; (2) Article
III’s categorical language contrasts with other Articles in which the
drafters designated federal powers as applying only to certain crimes215;
and (3) the existence of a common law practice does not mean the
Framers intended to continue it; after all, other constitutional
provisions, such as compulsory process, went beyond what the common
law guaranteed.216
What these previous critiques have not focused on is the common
understanding both at the Founding and in the modern era that petty
offenses tried summarily by a judge are crimes and criminal
prosecutions.

211. See id. at 246–48. Kaye also explains that the Virginia Declaration of Rights, while
broadly applicable to crimes, must have had the legal status of a legislative enactment because
bills of attainder were passed denying particular persons jury trials in serious offenses without
apparent contradiction. Id. at 250–51.
212. See id. at 257–58 (noting, for example, that Indiana’s 1818 constitution guarantees only
that “in all criminal cases except in petit misdemeanors, which shall be punishable by fine only, not
exceeding three dollars, in such manner as the Legislature may prescribe by law, the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate,” and North Carolina’s 1868 constitution guarantees that “[n]o
person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful
men in open court. The legislature may, however, provide other means of trial, for petty
misdemeanors, with the right of appeal” (first quoting IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 5; then quoting
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24 (emphasis added))).
213. Lynch, supra note 26.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. at 12 (discussing, for example, Congress’s Article I power to “define and punish
Piracies and Felonies” (emphasis removed)).
216. Id. at 13. Lynch went on to discuss why public policy and stare decisis considerations
should not persuade the Court to continue the exception. Id. at 14–16.
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II. THE INDEFENSIBILITY OF THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION ON
ITS OWN TERMS
This Part makes three points. First, the petty offense exception
contradicts the ordinary public understanding of the phrases “all
crimes” and “all criminal prosecutions”; those terms were understood
in both 1791 and today to include petty crimes. Second, there appears
to be no other contextual evidence to suggest these terms somehow
refer only to serious crimes. On the contrary, the use of “crimes”
elsewhere in the Constitution, the difference between the
Constitution’s language and more qualified language in some state
constitutions, and the use of “crimes” by Blackstone and in dictionaries
all corroborate that the term “crimes” includes all formally charged
offenses prosecuted in criminal court. Third, the exception is based on
a misunderstanding of historical sources such as Blackstone and the
existence of English and colonial summary trial practices. Blackstone
recognized petty offenses as criminal prosecutions, and he and other
Framing-era commentators and post-Founding state courts were
highly critical of these practices.217 Thus, from the point of view of
jurists who believe in enforcing categorical textual guarantees of
individual liberties in the Bill of Rights,218 whether or not they identify
as a particular brand of textualist, the petty offense exception seems
indefensible, at least on the grounds offered thus far.

217. See infra notes 225–230.
218. It is true that other constitutional provisions have been held by the Supreme Court to
mean something other than their “literal” phrasing. But aside from the Sixth Amendment right
to jury and right to counsel, none of these provisions has been interpreted in a way that restricts
an otherwise categorically guaranteed fundamental individual right enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, and most have been justified on grounds that invoke other parts of constitutional text or
otherwise at least attempt to grapple with fealty to text. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Double
Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1810–11 (1997) (noting the metaphorical and
alliterative phrase “life or limb” in the Double Jeopardy Clause really meant all crimes); John F.
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE
L.J. 1663, 1665 (2004) (explaining how the Court has justified apparently countertextual
expansions of sovereign immunity to federal jurisdiction in part by reference to other parts of the
Constitution’s text, but also disagreeing with the Court’s approach, arguing both that its attempts
to invoke Article III are unpersuasive and that “the heightened protection assigned to minority
interests in the amendment process may make it especially crucial for a court to adhere to the
compromises embedded in a precise constitutional text”).
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A. The Ordinary Meaning of “Crimes” and “Criminal Prosecutions”
The Sixth Amendment’s categorical language guaranteeing “in all
criminal prosecutions . . . the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury”
does not on its face appear to hinge on the seriousness of the
prosecution.219 Neither does Article III’s mandate that the “Trial of all
Crimes” except impeachment “shall be by Jury.”220 If interpreted
literally, these passages should presumably cover all crimes and any
criminal prosecution, period. The question becomes what the terms
“crimes” and “criminal prosecutions” include.
The meaning of terms like “crime” and “criminal prosecution” are
mercifully clearer than more amorphous terms in constitutional
criminal procedural provisions, such as the right of an accused to be
“confronted with the witnesses against” him or what constitutes “cruel
and unusual” punishment.221 Still, even the most apparently clear terms
require some contextual clues as to their meaning. One common
starting point is the ordinary public understanding of a term.222 Of
course, those inquiring into ordinary meaning might debate about
whether to look at the understanding of a term at the time of enactment
(which might better reflect the intended meaning of the term to the
drafters) versus at the time of interpretation (which might better reflect
the term’s meaning in the eyes of those who have the most pressing
reliance interests).223

219. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
220. Id. art. III, § 2.
221. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Limits of Textualism in Interpreting the Confrontation
Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737, 737–38 (2014) (arguing the importance of a textcentered approach to constitutional criminal procedure but acknowledging that textualism and
originalism do not offer bright-line answers to the question of what is a “witness” for Confrontation
Clause purposes).
222. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (2016) (“There are excellent reasons for the primacy of
the ordinary meaning rule.”).
223. See generally Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127
YALE L.J. 788 (2018) (noting why both time frames might offer important interpretive insights);
Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1103, 1140 (“Unlike the textualists, however, those adopting a contemporary meaning
approach should not consider the ordinary public meaning at the time of statutory enactment, but
rather at the time of interpretation.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1524 (1989) (arguing that
constitutional terms “should be interpreted as they are now understood, or as they have been
understood, by the American political community”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Paths of Resistance to
Our Imperial First Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. 917, 924–25 (2015) (“Originalists have
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Here, the ordinary meaning at the time of enactment and
interpretation is the same: formally prosecuted petty offenses subject
to criminal punishment have always been understood, then and now,
to be crimes and criminal prosecutions. To begin, several sources make
clear that, at the time of the Founding, the understanding of a “criminal
prosecution” and “crime” included petty crimes.
1. Blackstone. As a reminder, the Schick Court attempted to
buttress the petty offense exception by referencing Blackstone’s
Commentaries.224 In particular, while Blackstone notes that “crime[s],
or misdemeanor[s]” are both “act[s] committed, or omitted, in
violation of a public law” and are, “properly speaking, . . . mere[ly]
synonymous terms,” he also notes that in “common usage” the former
denotes “offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye.”225 But
the Court failed to notice, or at least to cite, Blackstone’s many
references to petty offenses as crimes. In fact, Blackstone dedicates an
entire section in his volume on “public wrongs” to summary
convictions for petty offenses, describing them in criminal terms as the
“conviction of offenders,”226 and “the party accused” in a summary
proceeding as “acquitted or condemned.” He also explicitly describes
“proceedings in the courts of criminal jurisdiction,” which are
contrasted with “civil causes,” as being “divisible into two kinds[:]
summary and regular.”227 His section on “Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction” also discusses “petty session[s].”228 His section on “Modes
of Prosecution” includes “presentments of petty offences.”229 What
sets apart summarily tried petty offenses, Blackstone explains, is not
that they are not criminal, but that they are “smaller misdemeanors

increasingly coalesced around an approach to constitutional-meaning elaboration that focuses on
the public meaning of words or phrases at the time the constitutional provision in question was
written.”).
224. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
225. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69–70 (1904) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *5).
226. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *273.
229. Id. at *301.
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against the public or common wealth,” which Parliament has
streamlined, without the right to indictment or jury.230
2. Dictionaries. The Supreme Court has looked to “[l]egal
dictionaries in existence” at the time of drafting when interpreting the
meaning of text.231 While selective quotations from certain dictionaries
might support one side or another of this issue, pre-Founding and
Founding-era dictionaries generally take the following approach: the
term “crime” can be used in both broad and narrow ways, like in
Blackstone; the term “misdemeanors” is sometimes colloquially
referred to as separate from crimes (“crimes and misdemeanors”) and
other times as crimes themselves (minor crimes lower than felonies);
and the term “prosecution” typically includes any criminal proceeding,
whether serious or minor. Ultimately, while such dictionaries offer less
than dispositive evidence against the petty offense doctrine, they
certainly do not offer strong support for it. At the very least, it is hard
to read these definitions and imagine that the term “criminal
prosecution” somehow excludes misdemeanors formally charged by
the Department of Justice by criminal information and punishable by
imprisonment.
Looking first to pre-1791 dictionaries, Samuel Johnson’s 1755
English dictionary defines “criminal” broadly: “1. Faulty; contrary to
right; contrary to duty; contrary to law. . . . 2. Guilty; tainted with crime;
not innocent. . . . 3. Not civil; as a criminal prosecution.”232 If one were
guided only by this definition, a criminal prosecution would appear to
be anything prosecuted in a criminal court, rather than a civil suit.
Johnson defines “crime” in ways both broad and narrow, as “[a]n act
contrary to right; an offence; a great fault; an act of wickedness.” But
he also appears to treat both a “felony” and “misdemeanor” as crimes,
albeit of differing degrees, defining the former as “[a] crime denounced
capital by the law; an enormous crime” and the latter as an “[o]ffence;

230. Id. at *272. See also id. at *281 (noting that summary convictions are, in a sense, a
“species of mercy to the delinquents, who would be ruined by the expence and delay of frequent
prosecutions by action or indictment”).
231. E.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (looking to dictionaries at the
time of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s passage to determine the meaning of “punitive damages”
as used in the statute).
232. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 515 (London, W.
Strahan, 1755).
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ill behaviour; something less than an atrocious crime.”233 Other pre1791 dictionaries similarly offer support for both a broad and narrow
reading of crime.234
Post-Founding U.S. dictionaries similarly reflect the broad and
narrow colloquial uses of “crime.” On one hand, the 1806 edition of
Webster’s initial compendium of the English language broadly defined
“crime” as “a violation of law to the injury of the public, a public
offense, sin,” and “criminal” as “guilty, faulty, not civil.”235 Webster’s
1828 definition of “criminal” was also broad: “relating to crimes;
opposed to civil; as a criminal code; criminal law”; “[a] person who has
committed an offense against public law” or, “[m]ore particularly, a
person indicted or charged with a public offense, and one who is found
guilty, by verdict, confession[,] or proof.” 236 To be sure, the 1828
edition, like Blackstone, notes that the term “crime” is sometimes used
in a “more common and restricted sense” to mean a “public wrong”
“of a deeper and more atrocious nature,” such as “treason, murder,
robbery, theft, arson, etc.”237 But of course, no one would credibly
argue that constitutional trial rights guaranteed in “all crimes” or “all

233. Id. at 797; 2 id. at 1329.
234. See, e.g., ROBERT CAWDREY, A TABLE ALPHABETICALL (4th ed., London, W.I. 1617)
(defining “criminall [sic]” as “fault,” with no definitions of “misdemeanor” or “prosecute” or
permutations thereof); HENRY COCKERAM, THE ENGLISH DICTIONARIE OF 1623, at 43, 122, 154
(New York, Huntington Press 1930) (1623) (defining “prosecute” as “To follow, to pursue”;
“crime” broadly as “A fault”; and not defining “misdemeanor”); N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL
ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed., London, 1726) (defining “crime” as “a Fault, a
foul Deed, an Offence, a Sin”; “misdemeanor” as “a behaving one’s self ill; an Offence or Fault”;
“High misdemeanor” as a “Crime of a heinous Nature, next to High Treason”; and “[t]o
prosecute” as “to pursue, carry on, or go on with, to sue one at Law”); G. GORDON & P. MILLER,
DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (N. Bailey, ed., London, 1730) (defining “crime” as “a fault, a
foul deed, an offence, a sin,” and “[a] criminal” as “an offender,” and “To Prosecute” as “to
pursue, carry on or go on with; also to sue at [l]aw,”; and “Misdemeanour” as “a behaving ones
self ill; an offence or fault” and a “High Misdemeanor” as a “Crime of a heinous Nature, and next
to high Treason”); JOHN KERSEY, DICTIONARIUM ANGLO-BRITANNICUM (3d ed., London,
1721) (defining “Crime” as “a foul Deed, or Offence; a great Sin”; “Criminal” as “guilty of some
Crime, or high Misdemeanor; also that relates to the Tryal of such Offences”; “Misdemeanour”
as “a misdemeaning, or behaving, one’s self ill; an Offence; or Fault”; “high Misdemeanour” as
“a Crime of a heinous Nature; next to High Treason”; and “To Prosecute” as “to pursue, carry
on, or go on with, to sue at law”).
235. NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 72
(Stoney’s Press 1806).
236. Crime, NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New
York, N. Converene 1828) [hereinafter WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY], https://websters
dictionary1828.com/Dictionary/crime [https://perma.cc/2J6G-TNSA].
237. Id.
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criminal prosecutions” are limited to treason, murder, robbery, and
arson cases. And if “theft” is a crime, then the routine denial of a jury
in petty theft cases is presumably unconstitutional.238 In any event,
Webster’s 1828 edition goes on to explicitly distinguish mere
“trespasses” from “misdemeanors,” the former encompassing “minor
wrongs against public rights.”239 Whereas misdemeanors are
“punishable by indictment, information, or public prosecution,”
“trespasses or private injuries” are generally dealt with through civil
“suit[s].”240 The dictionary of the primary U.S. competitor to Webster,
Joseph Worcester,241 defined “crime” as having both a broad and
narrow meaning, but it appears to squarely treat “misdemeanors” as
criminal prosecutions.242 In terms of early U.S. legal dictionaries, John
Bouvier’s 1843 edition of A Law Dictionary defines crime both broadly
as “an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law, either
forbidding or commanding it” and narrowly: “This word, in its most
general signification comprehends all offences, but, in its limited sense,
it is confined to felony.”243
238. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3212 (2016) (designating theft of property valued at less than
one thousand dollars as a 180-day criminal misdemeanor).
239. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 236 (distinguishing between
“trespasses” and “misdemeanors” in defining “crime”).
240. Id.
241. See HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 63–64 (2002) (describing
Worcester as a “competitor” of Webster in a twenty-year “dictionary war,” and Worcester’s 1860
dictionary as being, for a time before Webster’s ultimate triumph, “recognised [sic] on both sides
of the Atlantic as the best available dictionary”).
242. See, e.g., JOSEPH WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, PART 1, at
337 (1860) (defining “crime” as “[a]n infraction of law, but particularly of human law, and so
distinguished from . . . sin; an offence against society or against morals, as far as they are amenable
to the laws; a great offence; a felony” and citing Blackstone for the proposition that “[a] crime or
misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law”); id. (“A felony is a
capital crime, or a heinous offence; a misdemeanor is a minor crime, or less than a crime.”); id.
(defining “criminal” broadly as “not civil; as, ‘[a] criminal prosecution’”); id. at Part 2, 914
(defining “misdemeanor” as “[a] lower kind of crime; an indictable offence not amounting to a
felony”); id. at Part 2, 1144 (defining “prosecution” as “[t]he act of conducting a judicial
proceeding: — the conducting of a judicial proceeding in behalf of a complainant, as distinguished
from defence: — the conducting of a criminal proceeding in behalf of the government, as by
indictment or information”).
243. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LEGAL DICTIONARY 384 (2d ed. Philadelphia T. & J. W. Johnson,
Law Booksellers 1843); cf. id. at 346 (defining “conviction” as including “a record of the summary
proceedings upon any penal statute before one or more justices of the peace,” ending in
conviction and sentence). Bouvier also defines “prosecution” broadly as “the means adopted to
bring a supposed offender to justice and punishment by due course of law,” including not only by
indictment but “by an information.” II JOHN BOUVIER, A LEGAL DICTIONARY 382 (2d ed.
Philadelphia T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1843).
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Ultimately, the fact that “crime” can be colloquially understood
to mean particularly deeply and atrocious acts, even now,244 seems
minimally relevant in understanding the use of the phrases “all crimes”
and “all criminal prosecutions” in reference to the jury right. No
litigant or jurist has argued, to my knowledge, that the important
procedural rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment apply only to
“deeper and more atrocious” acts.245 While the Framers could have
limited Article III or the Sixth Amendment in this way, as with the
Fifth Amendment right to indictment only in a “capital, or otherwise
infamous crime,” they did not. Instead, the Article III right to jury
applies in “all Crimes” except impeachment, and the trial rights of the
Sixth Amendment, including the jury, apply not only to indictable
offenses (such as the Fifth Amendment) or “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” (such as the Impeachment Clause) but to “all criminal
prosecutions.”246
3. Other treatises and cases discussing summarily tried petty
offenses. Beyond Blackstone and dictionaries, other pre- and postFounding sources routinely described petty offenses as crimes. Indeed,
the very controversy over summary nonjury trials for some statutory
petty offenses centered on the assumption that these offenses were
crimes and thus at common law would be jury demandable.247 For
example, commentators describing the adjudication of petty crimes by
justices of the peace in England routinely describe such offenses in
criminal terms. One 1830 treatise noted how some accused of and
prosecuted summarily for petty offenses would “lay in gaol [jail] for
many weeks before their trial” even as they might be “innocent of the
charge against them,” and, whether guilty or not guilty, might become

244. The latest edition of Webster’s defines “crime” both broadly as “an illegal act for which
someone can be punished by the government” and narrowly as “a grave offense especially against
morality.” Crime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (July 4, 2021), https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/crime [https://perma.cc/EE69-RX3T].
245. Cf. supra notes 225 & 237 (discussing this definition).
246. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”), and id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 4 (“The President,
Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”), and id. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”).
247. See infra notes 316–321 and accompanying text.
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“familiarized with vice, and prepared for the commission of deeper
crimes.”248 English barrister Matthew Bacon noted in 1768 that even a
minor offense could not be charged by information unless the facts set
forth a “reasonable cause for the prosecution,” given that the case was
still a “public prosecution.”249 Likewise, even as New York passed a
statute in 1732 allowing summary trials for certain minor offenses, the
law explicitly described these offenses as “criminal.”250 Several early
and late nineteenth century treatises also described summarily tried
petty offenses as explicitly criminal.251 Moreover, from the early days
after the Constitution’s ratification to the present day, both the
Supreme Court and Congress have routinely acknowledged that nonjury-demandable petty offenses are still crimes.252 Likewise, U.S. state

248. 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 586 n.70 (1956) (quoting AN ALPHABETICAL ARRANGEMENT
OF MR. PEEL’S ACTS, BY A BARRISTER 53 (2d ed. 1830)).
249. 5 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 180 (Henry Gwyllim, Bird
Wilson & John Bouvier eds., 3d ed. 1852) (1768) (emphasis added).
250. See Act of Oct. 14, 1732, at 933 (allowing summary proceeding for “any misdemenor
breach of the Peace or other criminal offense, under the degree of Grand Larceny”).
251. 1 DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, RESPECTING TRIAL
FOR CRIMES 43 (1800) (describing “the petty nature of the trespass” and “venial transgressions”
as being the “subject of a proper criminal process in any of the inferior courts”); 1 JOSEPH
CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *106 (1816) (describing “all criminal
causes, from high treason down to the most trivial misdemeanour or breach of the peace”); 2
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 263, 266
(London, MacMillian and Co. 1883) (describing petty “police” offenses such as vagrancy, “which
are usually punished by courts of summary jurisdiction” and “regarded as a part of the criminal
law”); cf. CHITTY, supra, at *617 (“And in analogy to cases technically criminal, it is an invariable
rule that in all summary proceedings before justices under penal statutes, the evidence must be
given in the presence of the defendant.”); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
PLEADING 69–70 (London 1822) (positing that “[t]he law distributes crime into three great
classes; treason, felonies, and misdemeanors inferior to felony,” and that each involves a
“conviction” and “punishment”); GREGORY J. DURSTON, WHORES AND HIGHWAYMEN: CRIME
AND JUSTICE IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY METROPOLIS 426 (2012) (“At the opposite end of
the penal spectrum, prosecution of lesser crimes, especially those determined summarily, was, de
facto, often in the hands of a local official.”).
252. For example, the Supreme Court, in declining to incorporate the right to indictment,
noted that such a right, if applied to “all cases of imprisonment for crime,” would apply “not only
to felonies, but to misdemeanors and petty offenses” as well. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
524 (1884). Likewise, the Callan Court appeared to implicitly recognize that petty offenses are
“criminal prosecutions” in noting the general “guaranty of an impartial jury to the accused in a
criminal prosecution” “[e]xcept in that class or grade of offenses called ‘petty offenses.’” Callan
v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. 102, 140 (1837) (noting that defendants were “liable to the laws of that state, and amongst
others, to its criminal laws; and this too, not only for treason, murder and other crimes of that
degree of atrocity, but for the most petty offence which can be imagined”); Duke v. United States,
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courts253 and English courts post-ratification routinely refer to
summarily tried petty offenses as criminal proceedings.254
The case for treating formally charged petty offenses within the
ordinary meaning of crimes and criminal prosecutions is even more
obvious if one looks to how these words are commonly used and
understood today. For example, the twentieth-century Supreme Court
301 U.S. 492, 494 (1937) (“The original section divides crimes into felonies and misdemeanors.
The evident object of the proviso was to bring about a subdivision of misdemeanors by creating a
class of misdemeanors of minor gravity to be known as petty offenses . . . .”); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968) (noting in dictum, in a case involving a two-year serious offense, that
incorporation of jury right would not affect state petty offenses “if that [right] is construed, as it
has been, to permit the trial of petty crimes” by judge); Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624, 632 n.5 (1988) (“We have recognized that certain specific constitutional protections, such as
the right to trial by jury, are not applicable to those criminal contempts that can be classified as
petty offenses, as is true of other petty crimes as well.”); cf. JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
APPOINTED FOR THE PURPOSE, A SYSTEM OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, AND FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS THEREIN, S. DOC. NO. 22-85, at 66–
67 (2d Sess. 1833) (appointing justices of the peace to hear both civil cases and “all offences,
crimes, and misdemeanors” punishable by two years imprisonment or less, appointing public
prosecutors, and describing the justices’ jurisdiction as extending to “prosecutions which may
arise under the penal or criminal laws of this District”).
253. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chiles, 13 Ky. 194, 197 (1823) (“It will be conceded, that the words,
‘criminal prosecutions,’ do, in these clauses, include all proceedings for offenses against
government, for misdemeanors only, and penalties imposed by statutes, on account of mala
prohibita, as well as the higher grades of crimes, termed felonies and treason.”); Goddard v. State,
12 Conn. 448, 450, 451 (1838) (holding that the right to jury does not extend to “all criminal
prosecutions” but only to those charged “by indictment or information,” unlike the right to
counsel, which extends to municipal proceedings charged by a “tything-man”); Withers v. State,
36 Ala. 252, 263–64 (1860) (noting that the right to counsel applies “in all ‘criminal prosecutions,’”
including “every prosecution for a violation of the criminal laws of the State, in a court authorized
to determine the question of guilt or innocence by a judgment of acquittal or conviction, no matter
how trifling the alleged offense, or how insignificant the punishment awarded” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting ALA. CONST. art. I, § 10)).
254. See, e.g., Morgan v. Brown (1836) 11 Eng. Rep. 881, 882 (KB) (“[A] summary conviction
of assault . . . is made a bar to any further criminal proceeding.” (emphasis added)); Attorney
General v. Radloff (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 366, 373 (Exch.) (“[I]f the proceeding is one which may
affect the defendant at once, by the imprisonment of his body, in the event of a verdict of guilty,
so that he is liable as a public offender—that I consider a criminal proceeding.”); Parker v. Green
(1862) 121 Eng. Rep. 1084, 1087 (KB) (analyzing whether defendants may or must testify in
summarily tried petty offenses and noting that the law applies to “any criminal proceeding” where
someone “is charged with the commission of any indictable offence, or any offence punishable on
summary conviction”). As stated in Parker:
The words in this latter section, “any offence punishable on summary conviction,” are
to be read in conjunction with the preceding words, “in any criminal proceeding,”
which override the whole sentence. There are several kinds of summary convictions
before justices of the peace which are not criminal, but civil proceedings, and where
consequently the defendant is a competent witness—such, for instance, as proceedings
in bastardy, and many forms of fiscal proceedings.
Id.
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itself, in determining whether contempt is a crime in Bloom v.
Illinois,255 concluded that a crime is, “in the ordinary sense . . . a
violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.”256 Bloom quoted an earlier observation by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that “contempts are infractions of the
law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we
are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that
word has been understood in English speech.”257 More recently, in
Rothgery v. Gillespie County,258 where the Court held 8–1 that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel “[i]n all criminal prosecutions”259 attaches
at a pretrial bail hearing regardless if a prosecutor is present or has filed
formal charges, all nine Justices agreed that the filing of a formal
criminal charge, such as an information, indictment, or presentment, is
a commencement of a criminal prosecution.260 As Justice Clarence
Thomas noted, after consulting numerous common-law sources, “the
term ‘criminal prosecutio[n]’ in the Sixth Amendment refers to the

255. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
256. Id. at 201 (holding that “serious” nonsummary contempt charges in state court required
a jury trial because they were crimes, and according to precedent, serious state crimes are jury
demandable). While the Bloom Court in dictum suggested that petty contempt charges carrying
at most six months imprisonment would not be jury demandable, it was merely following the
petty/nonpetty line set by previous cases. Id. at 198 (“We accept the judgment of Barnett and
Cheff that criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious one
. . . .”). It did not purport to analyze whether summary contempt is or is not a crime. See id. More
broadly, direct criminal contempt in the presence of a judge has been treated as a sui generis
proceeding different from a typical criminal “trial” or “case,” a fact justifying the prosecution of
even the most serious contempts by information rather than indictment, which would otherwise
run afoul of the Fifth Amendment right to indictment in cases involving a capital “or otherwise
infamous crime.” See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 184–85 (1958). The correctness of this
line of cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
257. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201 (quoting Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914));
see also id. at 201 n.3 (quoting Green, 356 U.S. at 201 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[C]riminal
contempt is manifestly a crime by every relevant test of reason or history.”)).
258. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
259. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
260. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213. Justice Thomas opined that the hearing was not the
commencement of a prosecution absent a prosecutor or formal charge, but that the filing of an
information or other formal charge would have sufficed. See id. at 223–24 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 198 (“We have, for purposes of the right to counsel, pegged commencement to ‘the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment[.]’” (quoting United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984))).
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commencement of a criminal suit by filing formal charges in a court with
jurisdiction to try and punish the defendant.”261
In turn, federal petty misdemeanors, at the very least, are formally
charged offenses, either by information or violation notice; prosecuted
by the USAO262; punished under Title 18 (on “Crimes and Criminal
Procedure”) of the United States Code by possible fine and
imprisonment263; and described by the government itself as a “criminal
offense” for which the defendant will have a “criminal record.”264 Take,
for example, a defendant charged under 36 C.F.R. § 1004.10(a), for the
crime of “operating a motor vehicle” in the Presidio, a federal enclave
in San Francisco,265 in an unauthorized parking area.266 A person who
is convicted of violating § 1004.10(a) “shall be punished by a fine” and
up to six months’ incarceration.267 True, Congress has labeled such six261. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 223 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). As Justice Thomas
notes, Webster’s American Dictionary “define[s] ‘prosecution’ as ‘[t]he institution or
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges
against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment,’ and not[es] that
‘[p]rosecutions may be by presentment, information or indictment.’” Id. at 221–22 (second and
fourth alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 236); id.
at 220 (defining a criminal “prosecution” as the point of “formal accusation” (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301)); id. at 221 (defining “prosecution” as “instituting a
criminal suit” by way of indictment, information, or presentment (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *309)).
262. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 4, at 2431 (noting that federal petty offenses are prosecuted
by the USAO); Petty Offenses, OFF. OF THE FED. PUB. DEF. [hereinafter Petty Offenses],
https://www.ndcalfpd.org/petty-offenses [https://perma.cc/8JU2-23S4] (providing instructions to
those accused of petty federal offenses and noting that the USAO prosecutes the cases).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (classifying criminal offenses into Class A, B, and C misdemeanors,
and infractions, all subject to both imprisonment and fines).
264. A petty misdemeanor is charged either by information directly in district court or by
“violation notice” by a law enforcement agency and then prosecuted by the USAO. Both the
Central Violations Bureau (which handles violation notices) and the U.S. District Court’s website
warn defendants that they may have a federal criminal record once they admit guilt in a case
involving a violation notice, even for a petty offense that does not require a court appearance.
See, e.g., Received a United States District Court Violation Notice, CENT. VIOLATIONS BUREAU,
https://www.cvb.uscourts.gov/cvbpaygov/faces/pages/cvb_options.html [https://perma.cc/J4TAWNM2] (explaining that by paying a fine “you may be admitting to a criminal offense and a
conviction may appear in a public record with adverse consequences to you”); Central Violations
Bureau – Federal Ticket, U.S. DIST. CT. CENT. DIST. CAL., https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/clerkservices/cvb [https://perma.cc/84SU-ENMV] (same). I am not aware of any federal petty offense,
whether an infraction or Class B or C misdemeanor, that the United States takes to be
noncriminal for purposes of reporting criminal record.
265. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333,
§§ 101–03, 110 Stat. 4093, 4097–4101 (defining and establishing the Presidio Trust).
266. 36 C.F.R. § 1004.10(a) (2021).
267. Id. § 1001.3.
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month-sentence crimes petty,268 bringing them within Criminal Rule
58, for “Petty Offenses and Other Misdemeanors,” which allows judges
to deny defendants appointed counsel and a jury.269 But these
defendants are formally accused either by an information directly filed
by the USAO or by a violation ticket filed by a law enforcement agency
and prosecuted by the USAO.270 The person must appear on a “petty
offense calendar” and engage in plea negotiations with an Assistant
United States Attorney (“AUSA”).271 If they decide to fight the charge,
they must undergo a criminal trial against an AUSA and before a
magistrate.272 If the person is convicted after trial or admits guilt, they
will not only face punishment but will have a criminal record.273
B. Other Constitutional Provisions as Context
The common understanding of the terms “all crimes” and “all
criminal prosecutions” as including all formally charged criminal
offenses—and not merely serious crimes—is also reflected in the
Framers’ choice of language in other parts of the Constitution dealing

268. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7) (defining six-month misdemeanor as a “Class B
misdemeanor”); id. § 19 (defining a Class B misdemeanor as a “petty offense”). Again, the term
“petty” is a term of art typically used in the right-to-jury-trial context, given the Baldwin v. New
York six-month line. See supra notes 23, 173 and accompanying text.
269. FED. R. CRIM. P. 58.
270. See Petty Offenses, supra note 262 (explaining how defendants come to be charged with
petty offenses); E-mail from Heather Angove, Assistant Fed. Pub. Def., to Author (May 10, 2021,
3:03 PM) (on file with author) (explaining that AUSAs prosecute petty cases and cases are
charged by ticket or information).
271. See Petty Offense Docket/Traffic Tickets, U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. CAL.,
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/about/court-programs/petty-offense-docket-traffic-tickets [https://
perma.cc/YD7X-3TTS] (explaining that even for petty offenses not requiring a court appearance,
the person will negotiate with an AUSA).
272. See Petty Offenses, supra note 262.
273. Id. (noting that the person will have a criminal conviction if they lose). Of course, not all
wrongful acts or state sanctions of behavior are crimes. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431,
441, 448 (2011) (holding that person incarcerated on civil infraction for failure to pay child support
was not entitled to counsel and noting that the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases);
see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–89 (1973) (holding that a person might have a due
process right to counsel in probation revocation hearings but noting that such hearings are not
part of the criminal prosecution and thus do not fall under the Sixth Amendment); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 57, 59 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a due process right to counsel in delinquency
proceedings but not a Sixth Amendment right to counsel because such proceedings are not
criminal); Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of
dangerousness-based pretrial detention and noting several other noncriminal contexts in which
people are lawfully incarcerated, such as for material witness warrants, disease quarantine, and
deportation proceedings).
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with crimes. Even looking no further than the other trial rights
guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment, no court or commentator in the
history of the United States, as far as I have been able to discern, has
suggested that a criminal defendant could be denied the rights to
confrontation, to know the nature and cause of the accusation, to the
correct vicinage, to public trial, to speedy trial, or to compulsory
process, simply because the offense is petty or the punishment is
merely a fine or corporal. On the contrary, these rights have all been
deemed applicable to petty offenses.274
The Constitution uses categorical language in one other place
dealing with crimes: the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause,
which applies in “any criminal case.”275 To my knowledge, no scholar
or litigant has suggested that the right against self-incrimination applies
only to serious crimes. On the contrary, while the Supreme Court has
not addressed that precise issue, the Court has held that Miranda v.
Arizona276 applies to custodial interrogations, even in traffic
misdemeanors.277 In addition, though in less obviously categorical
terms, the Thirteenth Amendment allows involuntary servitude as
“punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.”278 This Amendment was not passed until after the Civil

274. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1972) (stating that no court has ever
held that “the trial of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice to the accused of
the charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf.” (quoting John M. Junker, The Right to Counsel in
Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 (1968))); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 9, Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25 (No. 70-5015), 1971 WL 126425, at *9 (conceding this point).
It is true that none of these trial rights applies to summary contempt proceedings, in which a judge
personally witnesses a contemptuous act and immediately punishes the actor, without a trial. See
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925) (“Such summary vindication of the court’s
dignity and authority is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common law, and the
punishment imposed is due process of law.”). But contempt proceedings are unusual precisely
because they are not prosecuted by government; they are immediate punishments imposed by the
trial court itself through a power that is “incidental to their general power to exercise judicial
functions.” In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 304 (1888); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 40–
42 (1976) (concluding that military tribunals are nonadversarial and thus not prosecutions by the
state).
275. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
276. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
277. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (“We hold therefore that a person
subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards
enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected
or for which he was arrested.” (footnote omitted)).
278. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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War and is thus not contemporaneous with the Sixth Amendment’s
ratification.279 Nonetheless, it has been notoriously used to punish
people—historically overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, Black
people in the South—for petty as well as serious crimes.280 The history
of using involuntary servitude to punish Black people for vagrancy,
theft, and other petty crimes is horrifying, and this Article is not
suggesting that an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
allowing such practices is the correct one. But this history is also stark
evidence that courts have been willing to treat petty offenses as crimes
when determining the constitutionality of a punishment as odious as
slavery but not yet for purposes of guaranteeing the fundamental right
to a jury, even as both jury provisions in the Constitution contain the
categorical modifier “all.” Courts’ willingness to do the former but not
the latter is conspicuous.
In contrast, the Framers chose more limiting language for other
rights or powers. For example, the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial in civil legal cases extends only to “[s]uits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,”281 the Fifth
Amendment right to indictment applies only to “capital, or otherwise
infamous crime[s],”282 and Article I grants Congress power “[t]o define
and punish Piracies and Felonies,” not other crimes, “committed on
the high Seas.”283 It would seem that when the Framers wanted to
specify that a provision apply only to certain offenses and not others,
they so specified. And when they wished to categorically include all
offenses (“any” and “all”), they did.

279. Thirteenth Amendment, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (2022), https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Thirteenth-Amendment [https://perma.cc/QD7B-DBW6].
280. See, e.g., Meagan Flynn, Kanye West’s Baffling 13th Amendment Twitter Outburst:
Maybe Not So Baffling After All, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018, 7:08 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/10/01/kanye-wests-baffling-13th-amendment-twitter-outbu
rst-maybe-not-so-baffling-after-all [https://perma.cc/ZZN8-QCDQ] (noting the history of punishing
Black people for vagrancy, theft, and other petty crimes through convict-leasing); see also
Howerton v. Mississippi Cnty., 361 F. Supp. 356, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (“Courts have long held
that reasonable work requirements may be imposed on one convicted of a crime, whether
misdemeanor or felony, without running afoul of the Thirteenth or Eighth Amendments.”); Stone
v. City of Paducah, 86 S.W. 531, 534 (Ky. 1905) (holding that misdemeanors are included in
“crime” under the Thirteenth Amendment).
281. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
282. U.S. CONST. amend V.
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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Nonetheless, two other constitutional provisions applying to
crimes merit discussion because courts or scholars have held or argued
that their scope is limited to serious offenses or are, at least, ambiguous.
The first is Article IV’s Interstate Extradition Clause, which provides,
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.”284 In 1860, the Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Dennison285
described the phrase “treason, felony, or other crime” as broad,
extending not only to felonies but to indictable (infamous)
misdemeanors.286 Ironically, even as the Court’s point was to broadly
construe the term crime, its language might implicitly suggest to the
modern reader that crime excludes petty, nonindictable
misdemeanors. However, read in light of modern shifts in charging
practices, the Court’s comment was clearly intended to reach, at
minimum, any crime charged by the state.287
The second context in which the term crime has been construed
more narrowly is the Fourteenth Amendment’s allowance of
disenfranchisement for “rebellion, or other crime.”288 Law Professor
Richard Re and a co-author, Christopher Re, have argued, primarily
citing dictionary definitions and the petty offense exception to the jury
right, that Reconstruction-era sources are inconclusive as to whether

284. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 2.
285. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860).
286. Id. at 76 (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2). The Court rejected the state’s argument
that a misdemeanor was not extraditable, citing Blackstone for the proposition that “[c]rime is
synonymous with misdemeanor” and noting that the phrase “other crime” replaced “high
misdemeanor” from the first draft of the Clause, the latter of which may have been “too limited.”
Id.
287. In describing the breadth of the clause, the Court defined “crime” as “includ[ing] every
offence below felony punished by indictment as an offence against the public.” Id. (emphasis
added). Not only was that statement dictum (because the case involved an indictable
misdemeanor), but that limit would be nonsensical today: many states and the federal government
have eliminated the indictment requirement from all misdemeanors, see, e.g., Siercke v. Siercke,
476 P.3d 376, 386 (Idaho 2020) (noting that all misdemeanors are now charged by information
rather than indictment in Idaho), making the Court’s definition of “crime” synonymous with
“felony,” untenably rendering the phrase “other crime” in “treason, felony, or other crime”
superfluous.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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this phrase included minor offenses.289 One way to think about this
clause, according to Re and Re, is that it applies to other crimes of
comparable seriousness to “rebellion,” the only named crime in the
clause.290 Another way to distinguish the disenfranchisement clause
from the jury right in Article III and the Sixth Amendment is that the
disenfranchisement clause purports to inflict punishment for the crimes
within its scope, whereas the jury clauses purport to guarantee a critical
right for the crimes within its scope. To interpret “other crimes”
narrowly in comparison to “rebellion” in the same clause seems less
problematic, from a textualist perspective, than interpreting a phrase
with the term “all”—“all crimes” and “all criminal prosecutions”—as
excluding a large swath of federal crimes. After all, the fact remains
that cases involving formally charged petty offenses are treated as
criminal prosecutions for all other trial rights besides jury and counsel
and are routinely described as—and punished as—criminal.
The Schick Court also deemed significant that the first draft of the
Constitution stated, “[T]he trial of all criminal offenses . . . shall be by
jury,” while the final version changed “criminal offenses” to
“crimes.”291 In the Court’s view, the “significance of this change” could
not “be misunderstood.”292 The Court declared, without much in the
way of analysis:
[W]hen the change was made from ‘criminal offenses’ to ‘crimes,’ and
made in the light of the popular understanding of the meaning of the
word ‘crimes,’ as stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was

289. See Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement
and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1652–53 (2012); see also Harvey v.
Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the term “crime” in the
disenfranchisement clause was not limited to common-law felonies, reasoning that “when the 39th
Congress meant to specify felonies at common law, it was quite capable of using that phrase”).
As a side note, the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” in the Impeachment Clause appears
to be a term of art borrowed from earlier English impeachment law, which described noncriminal
as well as criminal conduct. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman III, The Common Misconception About
“High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” ATLANTIC (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2019/10/what-does-high-crimes-and-misdemeanors-actually-mean/600343 [https://perma.
cc/7V3A-QLX3].
290. See Re & Re, supra note 289, at 1653–54 (noting that “other crime” presumably means
a crime comparable to rebellion in seriousness).
291. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904).
292. Id.
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to exclude from the constitutional requirement of a jury the trial of
petty criminal offenses.293

C. The Court’s Misuse of Common-Law Summary Bench Trial
Practices
Aside from invoking Blackstone’s mundane observation that
“crimes” and “misdemeanors” might colloquially be used to mean
grave and minor offenses, respectively,294 the Supreme Court has
offered no reason to interpret the terms “all crimes” and “all criminal
prosecutions” to mean only serious offenses. Instead, in a time before
textualism arose as a recognized school of constitutional
interpretation, the Court in cases like Callan and Schick appeared
content to reason that it should interpret the constitutional jury trial
right as incorporating limits placed on the jury right by Parliament and
colonial practices.295
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, from the
perspective of jurists who purport to look to the Constitution’s text first
(or even at all), the best evidence of the Framers’ view of allowing
summary convictions without a jury is presumably the categorical
language of the Sixth Amendment itself.296 Even then-Professor
Frankfurter, in his 1926 law review article supportive of the exception,
freely acknowledged that charges brought by the state ending in
punishment are “formal criminal prosecutions.”297 What has changed
since 1926 is not the Constitution, or the definition of crime, but the
Court’s philosophy of constitutional interpretation. The current Court,
293. Id. But see id. at 98 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“To say that ‘crimes’ means something
different from ‘criminal offenses’ is something that I cannot comprehend. A crime is a criminal
offense and a criminal offense is a crime.”).
294. See supra Part I.
295. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) (noting that the laws of England have long
allowed summary jurisdiction over certain petty crimes); Schick, 195 U.S. at 70–71 (adopting
Callan’s reasoning).
296. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 26–27 (1985) (arguing that when it comes to constitutional debates with many
divergent views, “the best evidence of textual intention is the language of the text itself”); cf. W.
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991) (stating that the “best evidence” of
legislative intent “is the statutory text” itself, and that the Court is bound by the text where it is
“unambiguous”); Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61–62 (1992) (holding that disconnection and
towing of trailer was a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment because it was literally a seizure,
regardless of the plausibility of the government’s claim that the Framers intended the
Amendment to only protect “privacy interests”).
297. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 21, at 937.
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newly dominated by those who purport to look to the ordinary
meaning of the Constitution’s text first and foremost,298 would find
little comfort in Frankfurter’s article.
Second, the categorical Sixth Amendment and Article III jury
right stands in contrast to those state constitutions ratified by 1791 that
conspicuously covered only certain crimes or only what was jury
demandable before ratification. While some states extended their jury
guarantee to “all criminal prosecutions” or “all prosecutions for
criminal offences,”299 other states extended their jury right only to
offenses that “heretofore” (before the state constitution’s ratification)
were jury demandable.300 Other states, such as Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, limited their jury right only to crimes carrying “capital” or
“infamous” punishments.301 After 1791, other states as they joined the
Union similarly chose for their jury right either categorical language
covering all criminal cases302 (with many making explicit that

298. See generally Haun, supra note 28 (explaining the dominance of originalism and
textualism on the current Court).
299. See, e.g., DEL. DECL. OF RTS., § 14 (1776) (“That in all prosecutions for criminal
offences, every man hath a right to . . . trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous
consent he ought not to be found guilty.”); MD. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts. art. 19 (“That in all
capital or criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by an impartial
jury . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. 22 (“[T]hat the inestimable Right of Trial by Jury shall
remain confirmed, as a Part of the Law of this Colony without Repeal for ever.”); VA. CONST. of
1776, Bill of Rts., § 8 (“That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent
he cannot be found guilty . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. X (“That in all prosecutions for
criminal offences, a man hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country;
without the unanimous consent of which jury, he cannot be found guilty . . . .”).
300. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts.,
§ IX (“That no freeman shall be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of
good and lawful men, in open court, as heretofore used.”).
301. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (“And the legislature shall not make any law, that shall
subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the government of the army
and navy, without trial by jury.”); N.H. CONST., pt.1, art. 16 (“Nor shall the Legislature make any
law that shall subject any person to a capital punishment, (excepting for the government of the
army and navy, and the militia in actual service) without trial by jury.”).
302. See MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. 1, § 10; IOWA CONST. of
1846, art. II, §§ 9–10; OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rts., § 10; cf. MINN. CONST. art.
I, § 4 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without
regard to the amount in controversy, but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in
the manner prescribed by law.”); NEB. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions
and in cases involving the life or liberty of an individual, the accused shall have a right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II, § 8 (“The trial of crimes
and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be by jury. . . .”).
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“criminal” was opposed to “civil”),303 or language explicitly limiting the
jury and other trial rights only to certain crimes. For example, some
explicitly limited the jury right to offenses charged by the grand jury304;
offenses jury demandable at the time of ratification305; or offenses with
a particular fine or imprisonment amount.306 In sum, if the Framers had

303. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties, in all civil cases, in the
manner to be prescribed by law.”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23 (“The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate in criminal cases; but a jury in civil cases in all courts, or in criminal cases in
courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.”); MONT.
CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 23 (“The right to trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain
inviolate, but in all civil cases and in all criminal cases not amounting to felony, upon default of
appearance or by consent of the parties . . . a trial by jury may be waived . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art.
I, § 7 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate; but a jury in civil
cases, in courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.”);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (1890) (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but” allowing
that in “misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict” and that a jury “may be waived
in all criminal cases . . . .”); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9 (amended 1980) (“The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate in criminal cases, but a jury in civil cases in all courts, or in criminal cases
in courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.”); UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 10 (“In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.”); cf. OR.
CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 17 (noting in § 11 what rights apply in “all criminal prosecutions,” and
followed by “[i]n all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate”); id. art. I, § 16
(“In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law, and the facts
under the direction of the Court as to the law, and the right of new trial, as in civil cases.”
(emphasis added)).
304. See TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 9 (“[T]he accused hath a right . . . in prosecutions
by Indictment or presentment, [to] a Speedy public trial by an impartial Jury . . . .”); OHIO CONST.
of 1803, art. VIII, § 11 (“[The accused has a right] in prosecutions by indictment or presentment,
[to] a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 18 (“[The
accused have the right in] prosecutions by indictment or information, [to] a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the vicinage . . . .”); IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 13 (“[The accused hath a
right] in prosecutions by indictment, or presentment, [to] a speedy public trial by an impartial
Jury . . . .”); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 10 (using substantially similar language); CONN. CONST.
of 1818, art. I, § 9 (same); ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 9 (same); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I,
§ 10 (1817) (same); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 9 (1820) (same); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art.
II, § 11 (same); FLA. CONST. OF 1838, art. I, § 10 (same); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7 (same); cf. ME.
CONST. art. I, § 6 (1820) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to . . . except
in trials by martial law or impeachment, [trial] by a Jury . . . .”).
305. See, e.g., KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 6 (“That trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and
the right thereof remain inviolate.”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The right of trial by jury as it has
heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain inviolate.”).
306. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 (“The right of trial by jury shall be and remain
inviolate, except in civil cases” with $1,500 or less in dispute “or in criminal cases” punishable by
a “fine only,” of $1,500 or less.); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (requiring that in the “trial of
misdemeanors in which the punishment [is] imprisonment in the penitentiary, or in which the fine
[is] in excess of one thousand dollars . . . [a] jury for the trial of such cases shall consist of six
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wanted to simply freeze in time the types of cases that happened to be
jury demandable in 1791 under English and colonial statutes, or to limit
the jury only to certain serious crimes, they could have done so using
the language these states did.
Third, even if there were evidence that the Framers intended the
Sixth Amendment to mirror the common law jury trial right, that right
did, in fact, cover petty crimes. As both Justice Harlan and William
Blackstone explicitly noted, the acts of Parliament establishing special
summary proceedings for certain offenses were in derogation of the
common law.307 Bench trials for crimes were a “stranger to” the
common law.308 Far from interpreting the Sixth Amendment as
codifying the common law jury right, adherents of the petty offense
exception interpret it as limited by English and colonial parliamentary
exceptions to that common-law right.309 But there is no evidence that
the Framers intended the Bill of Rights to incorporate whatever
exceptions to common-law rights Parliament had in mind; on the
contrary, the Declaration of Independence itself expressed outrage at
Parliament’s extension of admiralty jurisdiction in a manner that
denied Americans jury trials in traditionally jury-demandable cases. 310
Of course, a pragmatist could look to summary practices as evidence
men”); cf. MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (amended 1982) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction in all civil cases, both in law and equity, where the amount in controversy exceeds one
hundred dollars, and in all criminal cases where the punishment shall exceed three months
imprisonment, or a fine of more than one hundred dollars . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17 (“No
person shall be prosecuted criminally in courts of record for felony or misdemeanor otherwise
than by presentment or indictment or by information.”); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 19
(guaranteeing a jury “[i]n all cases where Justices of the Peace . . . shall have jurisdiction in the
trial of causes where the penalty . . . is fine or imprisonment”). Tennessee actually gave the jury
power to review sentences in cases with fines over fifty dollars. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. V, § 11
(“No fine shall be laid on any Citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty Dollars, unless it shall be
assessed by a Jury of his Peers . . . .”).
307. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 80 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *278–84.
308. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part I.B.2.
310. The Declaration of Independence lists the denial of the right to jury as a grievance (“For
depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury”), before condemning the King “[f]or
transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776). The drafters may have been particularly outraged over
Parliament’s extension of admiralty jurisdiction to U.S. cases that would be jury demandable in
England but were tried without a jury at sea. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 340 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 11 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 110 (1966), for the proposition that the Framers’ inclusion of this phrase in the
Declaration was inspired by outrage over Parliament’s extension of admiralty jurisdiction).
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of the types of compromises and conveniences legislatures of the past
have been willing to abide by and conclude that such practices would
be good policy today. However, that is no reason to impute those views
to the drafters of Article III or the Sixth Amendment.
Finally, and most fundamentally, the existence of English and
colonial common-law practices controversially limiting the jury right in
certain petty cases in no way proves that the Framers intended to
continue that practice. After all, other constitutional procedure rights
exceed what English common law guaranteed. For example, Professor
Jim Tomkovicz has noted that the American right to counsel “in all
criminal prosecutions,” which clearly covers felonies, went far beyond
the English common-law rule of denying lawyers in felony (but not
misdemeanor) cases.311 And although trials of impeachment were not
jury demandable at common law, the Framers still explicitly exempted
them from Article III’s jury trial right, suggesting that the Framers
intended the baseline right to apply even to crimes not jury
demandable at common law.312 Likewise, as Tim Lynch notes in his
1994 article Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, the Compulsory
Process Clause and the right of self-representation both exceed what
was guaranteed at common law.313 In contrast, other constitutional
provisions explicitly mirrored or referenced the common law right or
existing practices. For example, the Fifth Amendment Indictment
Clause “in effect, affirm[s] the rule of the common law,” which covered
capital crimes and felonies, by “substituting . . . ‘a capital or otherwise
infamous crime.’”314 Similarly, the Seventh Amendment right to civil
juries in legal disputes above twenty dollars315 allowed the continuance
of existing practices: “Justices of the peace historically could hear

311. See generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 14
(2002) (“[T]he states had dramatically departed from the restrictive English common law rule
regarding retention of counsel in serious criminal prosecutions.”).
312. At the time of ratification, impeachment was already a political affair, not a criminal
offense to be decided by a criminal jury at common law. See Mary L. Volcansek, British
Antecedents for U.S. Impeachment Practices: Continuity and Change, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 40, 44 & n.12,
52–54 (1990) (explaining that impeachment was decided by the House of Lords but “without
formal trials” and without any requirement of unanimity or continuity of judges, in part because
in some cases “guilt . . . ‘was obvious enough’”). If Article III’s “all Crimes” language should be
read narrowly to include only those crimes that were jury demandable at common law, the
exclusion of “Cases of Impeachment” would have been superfluous. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
313. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 26, at 14, 17, 20 n.75.
314. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885).
315. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
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claims when the amount in controversy was below a certain
threshold.”316 The Sixth Amendment contains no such limiting
language. It also seems particularly odd that the Framers would newly
insist upon a jury trial in a civil dispute involving more than twenty
dollars but not in a petty criminal prosecution involving a fine of more
than twenty dollars and/or a prison sentence of up to six months.
Ultimately, the historical evidence seems equally consistent with
the conclusion that the Framers rejected controversial summary
jurisdiction practices. The Framers had every reason to be skeptical of
summary proceedings rather than to want to replicate them through an
implicit petty offense exception to the Sixth Amendment’s trial rights.
By one account, summary proceedings had their origin in Henry VIII’s
desire to wield control through his notorious henchmen.317 While
summary proceedings were conducted in the “Petty Sessions” and
involved only crimes labeled minor by Parliament, in reality they often
involved traditional malum in se crimes like assault and theft or other
typically felonious conduct.318 People accused of these petty crimes
were often held in jail for long periods pretrial and, upon conviction,

316. See Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1673 n.49, 1674 (2005);
see also Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A Historical Exception for Small
Monetary Claims, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 129 (1987) (“During the relevant historical periods,
England and many American colonies and territories provided a procedure for adjudicating small
monetary claims that afforded no access to a jury.”).
317. NORMA LANDAU, THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, 1679–1760, at 343 (1984).
318. See Kaye, supra note 209, at 247 (noting that summary practices extended to “serious
derelictions”); Bruce P. Smith, Did the Presumption of Innocence Exist in Summary Proceedings?,
23 LAW & HIST. REV. 191, 196 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Summary Proceedings] (noting one
commentator’s concession that “it [was] well known that magistrates [were] in the practice of
applying their summary jurisdiction even beyond the spirit, certainly beyond the words, of the
law . . . assuming to themselves the power of adjudicating in cases of actual felony, by treating
them as misdemeanors” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Letter from James Traill
to House of Commons Select Committee on Metropolis Police Offices (Dec. 1, 1837)); id. at 194
(noting that several statutes covering traditionally felonious conduct allowed magistrates a choice
between proceeding, on the same allegation, either in summary trial or committing the defendant
to face felony charges); cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439–40 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the range of serious offenses considered misdemeanors at common law
(citing Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 572–73 (1924))).
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might be subject to serious punishment, from large fines to corporal
punishment319 to “transportation” (banishment)320 to imprisonment.321
Parliament’s questionable motivation in expanding summary
jurisdiction even to traditional malum in se crimes like larceny was
precisely to sometimes circumvent procedural rights that would
otherwise hamper conviction rates.322 Indeed, summary proceedings
were sufficiently brazen in their curtailment of procedural rights,
including the very burden of proof on the government,323 that to use
them as a template for interpreting the Constitution would negate
numerous other bedrock rights, starting with the presumption of
innocence.
In particular, in the decades before the Sixth Amendment’s
ratification, the power of summary conviction was the subject of
growing concern and sometimes outright criticism among judges and
commentators. Many judges in the early eighteenth century “disliked
the abrogation of trial by jury”324 that came with Parliament’s approval
of summary convictions, considering it “legal but suspect,”325 but

319. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280 (describing how after summary
proceedings, a magistrate who convicts an offender may “apprehend the offender, in case
corporal punishment is to be inflicted on him; or else to levy the penalty incurred”); DURSTON,
supra note 251, at 374 (noting that, “in lieu of payment,” summary conviction punishments could
include, for example, “[a] period in the stocks or pillory, a whipping, or a short custodial
sentence . . . depending on the offence involved”); see, e.g., id. at 381 (noting that the Bumboat
Act of 1762 prohibited unexplained possession of ships equipment, such as rope, and was
“punishable by a forty-shilling fine, with a month’s imprisonment in lieu of payment”).
320. See, e.g., Smith, Summary Proceedings, supra note 318, at 195 (noting that “every person
convict[ed] [summarily] of having knowingly bought or received ‘any stolen lead, iron, copper,
brass, bell metal[,] or solder’ was to ‘be transported for fourteen years,’ even in cases where ‘the
principal felon or felons’ had not been convicted” (third alteration in original) (quoting Lead and
Iron Act of 1756, 29 Geo. II, c. 30 § 1)).
321. See LANDAU, supra note 317, at 23; Smith, Summary Proceedings, supra note 318, at 199
(noting that some summary offense carried “substantial fines or multiple-month stints in the
house of correction” as punishment).
322. See Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750–1850,
23 LAW & HIST. REV. 133, 154 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Presumption of Guilt].
323. See id. at 135; see also Bruce P. Smith, The Emergence of Public Prosecution in London,
1790–1850, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 29, 62 (2006) (“By resorting to summary proceedings that
eased detection, aided apprehension, spurred the initiation of cases, bypassed juries, and required
suspects to ‘explain away’ their guilt, the English state developed a system of prosecution that
addressed these defects and, more strikingly, dispensed with private victims as well.”).
324. LANDAU, supra note 317, at 349.
325. Id. at 350.
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“nonetheless felt bound to respect Parliament’s intent.”326 These cases
often seemed a means of trying felonious conduct without the
procedural protections of the common law. For example, laws like the
Lead and Iron Act of 1756 increased summary jurisdiction over some
crimes, like certain thefts, that were traditionally felonies.327 By the
1750s, because of this dramatic increase in summary jurisdiction, there
was “a common and popular complaint” that magistrates had “too
much power.”328 Blackstone in 1765 decried the recent rise of summary
convictions “of late” as being problematic, stating that, “[I]f a check be
not timely given,” such cases “threaten the disuse of our admirable and
truly English trial by jury.”329 Blackstone goes on to say that while
summary convictions have their advantages, “[t]his change in the
administration of justice hath however had some mischievous effects;
as, [t]he almost entire disuse and contempt of . . . the king’s ancient
courts of common law, formerly much revered and respected.”330 In

326. Id. at 349. Landau cites a number of other sources to establish that these summary
practices were controversial for denying a jury right in derogation of the common law. See id. at
350 (noting how Lord Chief Justice Holt once wrote, “the defendant is put to a summary trial
different from magna charta, for it is a fundamental privilege of an Englishman to be tried by a
jury” (quoting WILLIAM PALEY, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS ON
PENAL STATUTES BY JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 50 (London 1814))); id. at 343 (noting that a
preface to Michael Dalton’s The Countrey Justice “damned summary conviction” because its
elimination of the jury right “may tend to the subversion of both liberty and property” (quoting
Preface to MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (London, G. Sawbridge, T. Roycroft &
W. Rawlins 1677))); id. at 344 (noting that Blackstone described summary conviction as
“fundamentally opposed to the spirit of our constitution”); see also 3 RICHARD BURN, THE
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 159 (London, 1756) (“The power of a justice of
the peace is in restraint of the common law, and in abundance of instances is a tacit repeal of that
famous clause in the great charter, that a man shall be tried by his equals . . . .”).
327. See Smith, Summary Proceedings, supra note 318, at 194 (discussing how magistrates
under these acts could decide, based on the same conduct, to proceed either in felony court or
summary proceedings); Smith, Presumption of Guilt, supra note 322, at 157–59 (noting how some
larcenies were tried summarily under the Lead and Iron Act, and how the Vagrancy Act of 1744
also extended the reach of summary proceedings); Lead and Iron Act, 29 Geo. II (1765), at pt. V
(allowing those arrested for stealing to be “deemed and adjudged guilty of a Misdemeanor” by a
justice of the peace); Vagrancy Act, 17 Geo. II (1744), at pts. VII, IX (allowing justices of the
peace to punish “vagabonds” and “incorrigible rogues” with corporal punishment or time in the
House of Corrections).
328. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL
THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 14–15 (1989) (quoting Preface to HENRY
FIELDING, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS, WITH SOME PROPOSALS FOR
REMEDYING THIS GROWING EVIL, at xxviii (2d ed., London 1751)).
329. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280–81.
330. Id. at *281–82 (footnote omitted). Notably, Blackstone warned:
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short, the “quality of summary justice had a bad reputation amongst
many eighteenth-century observers.”331
Closer to the Sixth Amendment’s ratification, the criticism in
England of summary convictions continued. One justice of the peace
in 1786 commented that the “mode of summary proceedings” had
replaced traditional rights, such as the right to indictment, in a way that
made English justices some of the most powerful judges in the world.332
The Whig Party leader, archrival of George III, and correspondent of
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, Charles James Fox,333 was an
opponent of expansions of summary jurisdiction. In 1792 (a year after
the Sixth Amendment’s ratification),334 he delivered an impassioned
speech against one of the Acts expanding summary jurisdiction. He
[T]he extensive power of a justice of the peace, which even in the hands of men of
honour is highly formidable, will be prostituted to mean and scandalous purposes, to
the low ends of selfish ambition, avarice, or personal resentment. And from these ill
consequences we may collect the prudent foresight of our antient lawgivers, who
suffered neither the property nor the punishment of the subject to be determined by
the opinion of any one or two men; and we may also observe the necessity of not
deviating any farther from our antient constitution, by ordaining new penalties to be
inflicted upon summary convictions.
Id. at *282.
331. DURSTON, supra note 251, at 376.
332. Id. at 372 (quoting HENRY ZOUCH, HINTS RESPECTING THE PUBLIC POLICE 1 (London,
1786)).
333. See Charles James Fox, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-foreignsecretaries/charles-fox [https://perma.cc/K3E9-5D68] (noting Fox was a Whig leader and enemy
of George III); Letter from Charles James Fox to Benjamin Franklin (Apr. 19, 1783),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-39-02-0307 [https://perma.cc/2VAB-S8XX]
(discussing trade issues); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Nov. 18, 1783), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-05-02-0149 [https://perma.cc/6JT2-AWN9] (telling
Abigail that he had a “cordial” meeting with Fox); cf. Letter from John Adams to Edmund
Jenings (July 17, 1782), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0113 [https://
perma.cc/EN2W-LV3M] (writing that Fox was an “able” man and discussing his potential to
become prime minister with apparent approval). See generally GEORGE M. WRONG,
WASHINGTON AND HIS COMRADES IN ARMS: A CHRONICLE OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
71 (Allen Johnson ed., 1920) (“Both [Thomas] Coke and [Charles] Fox, and no doubt many
others, wore waistcoats of blue and buff because these were the colors of the uniforms of
Washington’s army.”). On January 26, 1793, Fox distributed a public letter arguing against King
George III’s call to war against France’s post-revolutionary government. CHARLES JAMES FOX,
A LETTER FROM THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES JAMES FOX, TO THE WORTHY AND
INDEPENDENT ELECTORS OF THE CITY AND LIBERTY OF WESTMINSTER 24–25 (London, 1793).
Thomas Jefferson appears to have sent this letter as an attachment to a letter to George
Washington a few months later. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (May 5,
1793), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-25-02-0606 [https://perma.cc/4WZ7N4G6] (attaching a copy of Fox’s “pamphlet” and also mentioning the Marquis de LaFayette).
334. See Brian P. Smentkowski, Sixth Amendment, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/Sixth-Amendment [https://perma.cc/47HN-XCY4].
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argued first that summary practices tended to unfairly detain and
convict poor people, declaring that “[n]o man should . . . be permitted
to say . . . I will imprison a man for what I know I cannot prove, merely
because he is in a situation that will not enable him to procure bail.”335
Instead, he insisted that “if you think [a man] guilty,” let him “be tried
by a jury,” rather than “let a magistrate . . . inflict punishment on a man
whom a jury would acquit.”336 Even the Prime Minister during the
American Revolution, Lord North, acknowledged the “dictatorial
power” of metropolitan justices in summary proceedings.337 While
there is little available direct evidence about the Framers’ views of
summary convictions and their limits on procedural rights in petty
offenses, they may well have been aware of, and shared, these
concerns.
Notably, several U.S. state courts after ratification would come to
doubt the constitutional viability of local practices allowing summary
convictions.338 In New York, summary convictions were upheld,
notwithstanding withering criticism by at least one jurist, only because
New York’s state constitution, like several others discussed above,
extended the right only to those cases that were previously jury
demandable.339
335.

4 THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES JAMES FOX IN THE HOUSE
434 (London, 1815).
336. Id.
337. DURSTON, supra note 251, at 382 (quoting John M. Beattie, Garrow and the Detectives
Lawyers and Policemen at the Old Bailey in the Late Eighteenth Century, 11 CRIME, HIST. &
SOC’YS 5, 21 (2007)).
338. See, e.g., Geter v. Comm’rs for Tobacco Inspection, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 354, 356 (1794)
(“[T]hese kind of summary jurisdictions, without the intervention of a jury, are in restraint of the
common law: that nothing shall be construed in favour of them; but the intendment of law is
always against them.”); Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. 334, 337 (Mich. 1842) (reversing summary
conviction for keeping a house of ill-repute and reversing a fine because the offense was clearly
criminal and thus had to be indicted by state law); Barter v. Commonwealth, 3 Pen. & W. 253, 253
(Pa. 1831) (“If the charter did give the right to confer a power to imprison on summary conviction,
and without appeal to a jury, it would be so far unconstitutional and void.”). But see Pittsburgh,
Pa., Ordinance No. XIII, reprinted in BY-LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH,
AND THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY RELATING THERETO; WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO
JUDICIAL DECISIONS THEREON, AND AN APPENDIX, RELATING TO SEVERAL SUBJECTS
CONNECTED WITH THE LAWS AND POLICE OF THE CITY CORPORATION 296 (Pittsburgh,
Johnson & Stockton 1828) (continuing the practice of summary convictions but acknowledging
that they were “introduced in derogation of the common law” right to jury in criminal
prosecutions).
339. See In re Morris, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 381, 384–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (upholding nonjury
conviction because New York’s constitution states that the jury right “in all cases in which it has
been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever” but lamenting the high rate of false
OF COMMONS
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Ultimately, the right to a jury in “all crimes” and in “all criminal
prosecutions” is one of those sufficiently clear textual guarantees of a
significant individual liberty that its failure to be enforced literally is
conspicuous. Perhaps because of the petty offense exception’s long and
obscured history, courts, scholars, and litigants have let it lie. It is time
to eliminate the exception, once and for all. The next, and in some ways
more difficult question, is whether, and how, a jury trial right in petty
offenses would affect criminal justice on the ground.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A JURY RIGHT IN FEDERAL PETTY OFFENSES
This Part explores the implications of recognizing a right to jury
trial in federal petty misdemeanors.
To begin with, recognizing such a right in federal court alone
would be a significant change. As explained previously, federal
prosecutors file over sixty thousand petty misdemeanor charges each
year, from regulatory offenses to violent assaults.340 For those
convicted, these cases end in a federal criminal record, possible jail
time or onerous release conditions, and all the potential collateral
consequences that flow from a misdemeanor criminal conviction.341 In
particular, Professor Amy Kimpel in a forthcoming article, Alienating
Criminal Procedure, documents the procedural irregularities of petty
misdemeanor illegal entry prosecutions along the southern border,
where massive groups of defendants (sometimes fifty or more) are
arraigned, plead guilty, and are sentenced before a magistrate all in one
day.342
But the implications of the right could theoretically extend beyond
the federal right to jury. First, recognition of the right would, under
current doctrine, also entail recognition of a coterminous right to jury
in state court. Second, the arguments here might have implications for
enforcing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in “all criminal
prosecutions.” This Part addresses these issues and then explores

convictions in summary trials); see also supra notes 67, 300, 305 and accompanying text (discussing
other state constitutions that only extend the right to jury trials to cases that were previously jury
demandable).
340. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
342. See Kimpel, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing assembly-line conviction and punishment for
federal petty misdemeanor of illegal entry in southern border districts).
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whether a broader jury right would be meaningful in practice, given the
constraints of the modern criminal system.
A. A Right to Jury Trial in State Petty Misdemeanors?
Were the Supreme Court to recognize a federal right to jury trial
in petty misdemeanors, it would be hard pressed under current law not
to recognize a coterminous right in state court because of the doctrine
of “single-track incorporation.” Until the Civil War, the Supreme
Court applied the Bill of Rights only to the federal government.343 But
the Court would later interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in
1868,344 as incorporating parts of the Bill of Rights, thereby rendering
these parts applicable to the states as well as the federal government.345
The Court has since settled on a “selective incorporation” approach
that determines, on a piecemeal basis, whether a particular guarantee
in the Bill of Rights is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”346 If so, it is binding on the
states through the Due Process Clause.347 Under this selective
incorporation approach, the Court had no trouble holding in Duncan
v. Louisiana that the jury right is sufficiently fundamental to bind
states.348
In turn, under existing doctrine, once the Court deems a right
sufficiently fundamental to bind states, that right has the same meaning

343. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause does not apply to states).
344. See infra note 372.
345. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. There has been some debate as to what part of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, and to what extent. Justice Hugo Black
and others believed that the architect of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, intended to
automatically incorporate the entire Bill of Rights into the Amendment and render them binding
on state governments. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74, 76 n.7 (Black, J., dissenting),
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Justice Clarence Thomas, in contrast, has
insisted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause renders the entirety of Bill of Rights binding on
states, at least with respect to citizens. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 835, 837–
38 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). To date, the Court has declined to adopt these approaches,
and instead follows a “selective incorporation” approach through the Due Process Clause. See
infra note 348 and accompanying text.
346. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
347. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (applying selective incorporation
doctrine via the Due Process Clause and holding that the right against double jeopardy is not
sufficiently fundamental), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (deeming
double jeopardy guarantee fundamental).
348. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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and scope in state and federal court. A majority of the Court declared
as early as 1964 that incorporated constitutional rights do not have a
different meaning in state and federal court.349 While at least one
Justice—Justice Lewis F. Powell—suggested in a concurring opinion in
Apodaca v. Oregon350 that the right to jury unanimity was part of the
federal jury right but should not apply to states,351 the Court has three
times since explicitly rejected Justice Powell’s would-be “dual-track
incorporation” approach. First, the Court in Timbs v. Indiana352
rejected dual-track incorporation in the context of the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, reasoning that “if a Bill of
Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the
federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.”353 Second, the Court
in Ramos v. Louisiana354 held that the jury unanimity requirement
applies in state court and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
contemplate a “watered-down” version of a right in state court.355 Most
recently, the Court in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v.
Bruen356 struck down a New York law prohibiting carrying a firearm
outside the home except with a license based on a showing of “proper
cause,” reaffirming that “individual rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights and made applicable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment have the same scope as against the Federal
Government.”357 Thus, the Court’s recognition of a jury right in petty
misdemeanors in federal court would, under current doctrine, require
recognition of the same right in state court.
Yet requiring a jury trial for all state petty misdemeanors would
be a much more dramatic result than recognizing the right in federal

349. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11 (interpreting federal and state rights against selfincrimination as coterminous after incorporation and noting that the same is true for other
constitutional contexts, such as the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
350. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1397 (2020).
351. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371, 373–74, 380 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring),
abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397. Justice Powell’s Johnson concurrence applied to its
companion case, Apodaca, as well. Id. at 366.
352. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
353. Id. at 687.
354. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
355. Id. at 1397–98.
356. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
357. Id. at 2137.
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court. While the number of federal petty misdemeanor prosecutions
annually is large, it is dwarfed by the millions of state court
misdemeanors prosecuted each year. Moreover, federal six-month
misdemeanors before Callan appear to have been treated as jury
demandable,358 meaning that eliminating the exception in federal court
would merely return federal practice to what it originally was. In
contrast, municipal police courts summarily trying various petty
offenses, at least in certain jurisdictions, existed long before Callan.359
The reality is that the right to jury, like the right to counsel, is unusual
among criminal procedure rights in that full enforcement in modern
state courts would be significantly more difficult than in modern
federal court given the vast number of cases and variety of local
practices.360
On the other hand, the summary practices of municipal police
courts, like the English summary practices that preceded them, have
never operated without controversy, even in colonial times.361
Moreover, the effect on state courts of eliminating the petty offense
exception would depend on whether, and how, states modify their
charging and offense classification practices in response. States might,
for example, bring fewer misdemeanor charges, decriminalize certain
offenses,362 or more aggressively attempt to resolve charges without

358. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 21, at 934–65 (examining summary
practices in colonial Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia).
360. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968) (acknowledging that
uniformity in the enforcement of the Sixth Amendment “is a more obvious and immediate
consideration” in federal court than in state court); id. at 171 (Fortas, J., concurring) (noting
reasons to apply the jury trial right differently in state than federal court); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 76 (1970) (Burger, J., dissenting) (same); Brief for Respondent at 10–13, Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (No. 77-1177) (arguing against an “absolute right” and that the jury
right and right to counsel have “their cost” in common).
361. See supra Part II.C.
362. Administrative infractions and civil suits are noncriminal and not subject to the
procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S.
431, 435, 441 (2011) (holding that a person incarcerated on civil infraction for failure to pay child
support was not entitled to counsel and noting that the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal
cases); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (listing factors to determine
whether a sanction for conduct is regulatory or punitive, the latter of which is subject to criminal
procedural rights of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Even traffic violations are treated as
criminal offenses in some states, a practice that itself is being reconsidered precisely because the
criminal designation leads to criminal sanctions arguably inappropriate for such minor offenses.
See, e.g., Merrill Balassone, Taking Minor Traffic Tickets out of Criminal Court, CAL. CTS.
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trial.363 In fact, states engaged in such modifications in response to
Baldwin in 1970, when the Court set the line between petty and
nonpetty offenses at six months.364 In Baldwin’s wake, some states
modified their misdemeanor codes to reduce certain statutory
maximums from one or two years to six months or less, deliberately
eliminating overnight the right to jury trial for those offenses.365 Such
legislative work-arounds suggest that reviving the jury right might
simply restore state practices to what they were before Baldwin. Of
course, the massive state misdemeanor system of 2022 could never look
the way it did in 1970. But part of the reason for that might be
inappropriate charging practices that take advantage of a lack of
procedure to allow more cases to be brought.
The alternative to this potentially dramatic change to state court
practices would be for the Court to backtrack on its condemnation of
dual track incorporation and apply a watered-down version of the jury
right in state court that would apply only to serious offenses. That path,
too, would be radical in its own way, given the certainty with which the
Court rejected dual-track incorporation in Timbs, Ramos, and Bruen.
Dual-track incorporation also would seem an awkward fit with the
view of Justice Thomas, and perhaps others on the Court, that the
Fourteenth Amendment automatically incorporates the entire Bill of
Rights.366

NEWSROOM (July 5, 2017), https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/taking-minor-traffic-tickets-outcriminal-court [https://perma.cc/VR4P-SJ3E] (describing a proposal of the Commission on the
Future of California’s Court System to move certain traffic offenses from criminal court to civil
court to reduce the criminal caseload and overly punitive outcomes).
363. See infra Part III.B.
364. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
365. See Robert P. Connolly, Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury Trial,
49 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 225–26 (1980); Bado v. U.S., 186 A.3d 1243, 1263–65 (D.C. 2018)
(Washington, J., concurring) (criticizing the 1994 D.C. Misdemeanor Streamlining Act for
purposely eliminating jury trials for various misdemeanors traditionally jury demandable).
366. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. A “dual track” approach would involve a
case-by-case determination that particular rights or aspects of rights (such as the unanimity
requirement for criminal juries) are less critical as applied to state than federal court, which is an
inherently selective approach. Cf. Will Baude, Originalism and Dual-Track Incorporation,
REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 24, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/24/
originalism-and-dual-track-incorporation [https://perma.cc/B2VV-6BQ6] (noting that a selective,
fundamental-rights view of incorporation allows for “daylight” between the fundamental rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the “positive . . . constitutional rights codified in
1791”).

ROTH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2022 1:44 PM

666

[Vol. 72:599

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

But there are ways the Court could justify a dual-track approach
with respect to extending the jury right to all criminal prosecutions in
federal but not state court. First, the Court could simply recognize that
its prior cases pose very different questions in terms of cost and
practicability of enforcing rights in state court. The cases in which the
Court explicitly rejected dual-track incorporation have involved rights
that are generally just as, or nearly as, practicable to enforce in state
court as in federal court. The immediate cost to states of requiring
juries to be unanimous, avoiding excessive fines, or legalizing the
carrying of firearms, is surely relatively small compared to the cost to
states of requiring juries in all criminal prosecutions. The only other
comparably expensive right that is binding on states but could be
further extended in scope is the right to counsel, but at the time of
Gideon v. Wainwright, which recognized a right to appointed counsel
in state court,367 most states already guaranteed such a right in all
felonies.368 And at least one scholar has suggested the right to
appointed counsel might itself be a good candidate for dual-track
incorporation because the Scott v. Illinois “actual imprisonment”
standard is so blatantly violative of the Sixth Amendment’s text (and
thus makes little sense when applied to federal court) but might save
states significant money.369 More broadly, others have argued that it is
perfectly natural for different levels of government to have different
versions of a right.370
Second, the Court could justify a dual-track incorporation
approach to rights that had a different commonly understood meaning
in 1791 than in 1868, the year of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. One scholar has argued that originalists should always
consider dual-track incorporation a valid option, both because the
public understanding of a right may have shifted from 1791 to
Reconstruction and because selective incorporation of rights (for those

367. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
368. See Brief for Petitioner at 29, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155) (noting that thirty-five
states already provided such a right in felonies like Gideon’s).
369. Chhablani, supra note 208, at 518–23.
370. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1528 (2005) (arguing that a constitutional principle may be
applied differently to different levels of government); see also Kristina M. Campbell, Can Rights
Be Different? Justice Stevens’ Dissent in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 733, 748–59 (2013) (discussing the implications of Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in
McDonald for dual-track incorporation).
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who believe in it) allows for “daylight” between a right’s original
meaning and its enforcement in state courts.371 The Bruen Court also
hinted at such an approach.372 With respect to whether to abandon the
petty offense exception in state court, this approach bears no obvious
answer. On one hand, the common public understanding of a criminal
prosecution, and whether a state six-month criminal misdemeanor
prosecuted under state law qualifies, does not appear to have been
appreciably different in 1868 than in 1791. On the other hand, the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment might have been more wary of
juries overall, including in minor offenses, given anticipated local
resistance to Reconstruction Era civil rights prosecutions.373
Ultimately, it is difficult to read Duncan v. Louisiana, in which the
Court waxed poetic about the importance of the jury trial right as a
check on judges and the state, and to allow summary practices in state
court to continue unabated, even as courts enforce the right in federal
petty misdemeanors. But if the choice is between enforcing the
Baldwin six-month petty offense line in both federal and state court
and enforcing it only in state court, the latter is more defensible.
B. A Right to Counsel in All Criminal Prosecutions?
If the Court recognized that the phrase “all criminal prosecutions”
in the Sixth Amendment included all formally charged crimes subject
to punishment in criminal court, that holding would have implications
for more than just the jury right. The right to counsel is still only
constitutionally guaranteed in cases involving actual imprisonment, per
Scott v. Illinois.374 Indeed, under Scott, even a nonpetty, jurydemandable misdemeanor or felony offense carries no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel if the defendant is not sentenced to
incarceration.375
371. Baude, supra note 366.
372. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2138 (2022) (noting the
“ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing
understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 when
defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal Government)” but declining
to further address the issue because of its conclusion that the Second Amendment’s meaning in
1791 and 1868 was similar).
373. See Bressler, supra note 45, at 1136 (arguing that “Reconstruction Congresses sought to
reduce jury power” for fear jurors would nullify).
374. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1979).
375. As Professor Beth Colgan has pointed out, even the states in Gideon argued that there
is no distinction, for right-to-counsel purposes, between incarcerative and nonincarcerative
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There are only two ways to reconcile the Scott “actual
imprisonment” standard with a new commitment to enforcing the Sixth
Amendment’s trial rights in “all criminal prosecutions.” The first
would be to embrace dual-track incorporation and recognize a right to
counsel in all federal criminal prosecutions, while limiting it in state
court on cost or federalism grounds. Given the Court’s vehemence in
rejecting dual-track incorporation in recent years, that approach seems
unlikely. Were the Court to take it, the resulting expansion of the
federal right would be dramatic in itself.376 Indeed, over half of federal
defendants whose cases end in criminal charges, including traffic
offenses, drug crimes, fraud, impaired driving, and immigration
offenses, proceed pro se.377
The second way to reconcile Scott with a literal reading of “all
criminal prosecutions” would be for the Court to recognize a Sixth
Amendment right to retained, but not appointed, counsel in cases
without an actual jail or prison sentence. This approach, too, would be
a dramatic departure from existing doctrine. While Scott involved the
right to appointed counsel, the Court has implied, and lower courts
have assumed, that the right to retained counsel and right to appointed
counsel are coterminous.378 The broad language of Gideon v.
Wainwright, in which the Court held the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel—and to appointed counsel—binding on states, certainly made

punishments. Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 118
(2019). Indeed, a conviction alone is a deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 410 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the right to effective assistance of
appellate counsel with the opportunity to be heard in the denial of public assistance benefits
because in the former, the appellant’s “‘liberty’ was deprived by his lawful state criminal
conviction,” not his unsuccessful appeal).
376. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
377. Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 492 n.133 (2007). Hashimoto has conducted the most comprehensive empirical examination
of the right to counsel in federal petty misdemeanors. She notes huge gaps in available data but
estimates that, for the period 2000–2005, 64 percent of federal misdemeanor defendants
proceeded pro se. Id. at 489–90 & 489 n.128. Because some federal misdemeanors are deemed by
statute as nonpetty (if they carry more than six months’ maximum sentence), this statistic alone
does not show how many petty misdemeanor cases are pro se.
378. Indeed, some state courts have cited Scott in denying defendants the right to retained
counsel as well. See, e.g., People v. MacArthur, 731 N.E.2d 883, 887–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(holding that because the rights to retained and appointed counsel are coextensive, defendant had
no right to retained counsel in a case not involving a jail sentence); Layton City v. Longcrier, 943
P.2d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). But see United States v. Ashurst, No. 2:11–po–124,
2012 WL 1344824, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2012) (concluding that a magistrate judge likely erred
in telling defendant he had no right to retained counsel, even in a case involving a fine only).
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no distinction between the two.379 The assumption by lower courts that
the two rights are coterminous makes sense; after all, the Sixth
Amendment states that the accused “shall enjoy the right to . . . the
Assistance of Counsel,”380 and without the right to appointed counsel,
indigent defendants would not “enjoy the right” to the assistance of
counsel.381 As a leading treatise puts it,
Supreme Court precedent . . . indicate[s] that . . . proceedings . . .
subject to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are . . . the same
whether the issue is being represented by retained counsel or
requiring the state to appoint counsel . . . . Indeed . . . there is but a
single Sixth Amendment right to counsel, encompassing both
retained and appointed counsel.382

To be sure, there are at least two current Justices who appear
willing to hold that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only a right to
retained, not appointed, counsel.383 But even if the Court were to
interpret the right in this way, it would still have to contend with a line
of cases—still good law—in which the Court has recognized a right to
appointed counsel on equal protection or due process grounds.384
379. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–35 (1963).
380. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
381. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 707
(1996) [hereinafter Amar, Sixth Amendment] (stating without elaboration that “[t]he text of the
Counsel Clause can be read either way”).
382. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 694 (6th ed. 2017); see also State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 261 (Iowa 2015) (“[I]f
there is a due process right to retained counsel, there is also a due process right to appointed
counsel when a defendant cannot pay for retained counsel.”); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 72 (1932) (“In a case such as this . . . the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary,
is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.”).
383. See, e.g., Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 757–58 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting
there was no right to appointed counsel at common law and arguing that neither Gideon nor its
immediate precedents “attempted to square the expansive rights they recognized with the original
meaning” of the right to counsel). Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas’s Garza opinion. Id. at
750.
384. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (recognizing a right to
appointed counsel on direct appeal, even though there is no constitutional right to an appeal); id.
(“[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”); id.
(stating that without a right to appointed counsel on appeal, “[t]he indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has
a meaningful appeal”); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967) (holding that states must
“assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal—as nearly as is
practicable—as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who are able to
afford the retention of private counsel”); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967) (per curiam)
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Several scholars have also argued that the right to appointed counsel
could—and should—be grounded in either equal protection385 or due
process.386 Ultimately, the primary barrier to litigants arguing for a
broader right to counsel in both state and federal court is likely the
specter of overturning Gideon.387
CONCLUSION: WOULD A BROADER JURY RIGHT BE MEANINGFUL?
This Article has argued that the petty offense exception to the jury
trial right is untenable on its own terms. A final remaining question is
whether a broader jury right would change anything on the ground.

(holding that the advantage of appellate assistance “may not be denied to a criminal defendant,
solely because of his indigency”); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459 (1969) (rejecting
on equal protection grounds the State’s position that an indigent could be denied a free transcript
of his conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance for purposes of appeal because it was a
petty offense); cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (concluding that an
indigent defendant must be given a free transcript where access to a transcript is necessary to a
meaningful appeal, even though there is no constitutional right to appeal); id. at 18 (“There is no
meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves
in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded
to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.”). While Justice Frankfurter only
concurred in the judgment, he agreed with the plurality that “when a State deems it wise and just
that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions
draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons . . . from securing such a review.” Id. at
22–24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
385. See, e.g., Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using
Equal Protection To Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2299, 2304–05 (2017).
386. See, e.g., Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 381, at 707–08 & n.249 (“[T]he indigent’s
right to appointed counsel could also be derived from the innocence-protecting spirit of the Due
Process Clause . . . . In today’s world, an indigent defendant without counsel runs an undue risk
of being convicted, even if wholly innocent.”); Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon?, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215 (2003); Tracey Maclin, A Criminal Procedure Regime Based on
Instrumental Values, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 213 (2005) (arguing that Gideon’s holding “is not
supported by the text of the Sixth Amendment,” and is “better supported by an instrumental due
process model rather than ‘a formalistic focus on the textually referenced “assistance of counsel”’”
(quoting DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT,
AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 117 (2003))).
387. In a separate article, I offer a more detailed history of how the petty offense exception
interacts with the right to counsel and offer results of original historical research, revealing that
the right to counsel in nonjury summary proceedings in England, while limited, was recognized
as an important and routine practice, especially when the accuser was a local official or a private
party with counsel. See, e.g., Cox v. Coleridge (1822) 1 B. & C. 37, 49 (K.B.) (Abbott, C.J.) (noting
that even where magistrates perform a ministerial role (in bail and commitment hearings) rather
than judicial role (in summary proceedings), thus where the right to counsel is less important, “in
practice, magistrates do permit, on many occasions, the presence of advocates for the parties
accused”).
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Would the right become yet another bargaining chip in the plea
process, or even encourage more coercive pleas by making trials more
expensive?388 On the other hand, even as a bargaining chip, the right
might offer defendants who plead guilty—or who agree to waive a jury
in exchange for lenience389—a discount more accurately calibrated to
the rights they give up. Making petty offenses jury demandable might
also curtail some of the more controversial “papering down” charging
practices, in which a serious case that should end in either a full
acquittal or felony conviction after a jury verdict ends instead in
prosecutors dismissing the more serious count because of proof
problems and securing a bench trial on a lesser, more-easily-proven
charge.390 A broader right might also increase the number of trials, if
people charged with petty offenses are more willing to take a chance
on a jury trial rather than accept a plea.
In some ways, juries might be particularly influential in petty
cases. Imagine, for example, an unhoused person facing a charge of
unlawful entry into a parking garage, an undocumented immigrant
facing a driving without a license or illegal entry charge,391 a person
facing a charge of marijuana possession in a jurisdiction where it is still
illegal under state law, or a person facing a simple assault charge with
a viable self-defense claim that is likely to be more sympathetic to a

388. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 299–
302 (2011) (arguing that Gideon and other procedural rights have made trials too expensive and
encouraged coercive pleas and artificially high sentencing schemes to give prosecutors leverage
in plea negotiations); ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 99–101 (2003) (arguing that plea bargaining is the “ugly child” of “adversarial legalism,” an
American focus on rights and adversarial litigation over rights rather than substantive outcomes).
389. See generally John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181
(2015) (arguing that reformers should consider which trial rights might be waived in exchange for
leniency, from jury to standard of proof).
390. This is the phenomenon I believe was on display in the case described at the beginning
of the paper. Cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, GEORGE C. THOMAS III & DANIEL S. MEDWED, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: PROSECUTING CRIME 1106, 1111 (7th ed. 2020) (raising ethical concerns with
prosecuting a serious felony assault charge as a misdemeanor in exchange for waiver of procedural
rights).
391. Indeed, as Professor Amy Kimpel has noted in the immigration context, federal
lawmakers reduced the maximum penalty for illegal entry from twelve to six months precisely to
remove the jury trial right, out of concern that community members in southern border districts
were too often declining to indict or convict defendants of immigration offenses on extralegal
grounds, such as disagreement with federal immigration policy. See Kimpel, supra note 7, at 22–
23 (citing Doug Keller, Re-Thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 83–84
(2012)) (noting that jury nullification was one impetus for reducing the maximum penalty for
illegal entry to six months).

ROTH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2022 1:44 PM

672

[Vol. 72:599

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

local jury than a judge.392 Defendants in such cases might desire a jury
as factfinder, both because of the jury’s more diverse voice in finding
facts393 and the greater likelihood of nullification.394
Moreover, in the petty offense context, the jury right might be less
open to the critique from some progressive scholars that criminal
procedure rights lend a veneer of legitimacy to overly punitive
convictions and sentences.395 Because of the natural limit on the state’s
ability to inflict severe punishment in petty cases, additional procedural
protections might actually lead to lower conviction rates and more
lenient pleas without widening the net. A jury in a petty case might be
especially powerful if told of the punishment and collateral
consequences, or if given a greater role in sentencing. While jury
punishment is somewhat of a third rail in felony cases, there might,
perhaps counterintuitively, be more reason to allow juries greater
power over sentencing in petty cases.396 Of course, the expanded right
might carry unintended legislative consequences; just as some
jurisdictions responded to Baldwin by reducing statutory maximums to
392. Cf. Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 319, 321 (2012) (arguing, counterintuitively, for grand juries in misdemeanor cases); Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilty, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658–69 (2010) (noting that easy, minor cases might actually be the most
normatively difficult to prosecute); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327,
334–35, 352, 362 (2017) (explaining the limits and promise of MPC § 2.12, de minimis crimes, and
judicial reluctance to exercise the power of dismissal).
393. To be sure, the diversity of a jury’s voice depends on the jury itself being diverse, a
questionable assumption. See, e.g., Annie Sloan, Note, “What To Do About Batson?”: Using a
Court Rule To Address Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 260 (2020) (calling
for more research to explore the efficacy of new state rules limiting racial proxies in
peremptories); Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 788–89 (2020) (arguing that peremptory challenge reforms
alone will not solve disparities in jury selection without attention to “for cause” challenges as
well).
394. Of course, courts have an awkward relationship with jury nullification, recognizing its
impressive pedigree but refusing to instruct juries on their power to nullify. See generally United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the history and benefits of
nullification, while declining to recognize as error the failure to instruct the jury on its power to
nullify).
395. See generally Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE L.J. 2176 (2013) (citing critical race theory as support for the argument that public
defenders and other procedural rights legitimate the system by making it look fair, even as the
outcomes are overly punitive).
396. See generally Bowers, supra note 392 (arguing for grand juries to address the normative
reasonableness of misdemeanor charges); Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Informed Jury,
75 VAND. L. REV. 823 (arguing that juries should know and consider the severity of a defendant’s
potential sentence).
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eliminate the jury right,397 perhaps a broader right would motivate
legislatures to increase statutory maximums. But given that defendants
do not appear to be sentenced to jail time for petty offenses in large
numbers,398 slight increases in misdemeanor sentencing ranges would
probably not affect actual sentences in most cases.
One final thought is that reviving the jury in petty offenses might
bring the number of misdemeanors in line with traditional principles of
limited government and criminal liability. To be sure, the USAO
argued against a recent proposal to statutorily expand the jury right in
misdemeanors in Washington, D.C., on grounds that there are too
many misdemeanors to make such a right practicable.399 But the answer
to that sort of “too much justice” concern could be to restore charging
practices to what they were before misdemeanor court was so
expansive or, as criminologists Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins
argued to the White House over forty years ago, to develop an
“administrative law of crime” to deal with minor offenses.400 In a time
where both the Black Lives Matter movement and the libertarianleaning Manhattan Institute are bemoaning the bloated criminal
state,401 such reforms might actually be possible.

397. See supra note 365 and accompanying text; Kimpel, supra note 7, at 22–23 (discussing
reduction of illegal entry penalty to eliminate jury right).
398. For example, over 60 percent of federal misdemeanor defendants appear pro se, see
Hashimoto, supra note 377, at 490, and Scott requires a lawyer in any case involving jail time.
Thus, these cases involve no jail time.
399. See Elana Suttenberg, Assistant U.S. Att’y, Statement to the D.C. Council’s Comm. on
the Judiciary and Pub. Safety (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/us-attorneysoffice-testifies-hearing-revised-criminal-code-act-2021 [https://perma.cc/64JD-5F66].
400. See James B. Jacobs, In Memoriam: Norval Morris (1923–2004), 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 455,
459 (2005) (attributing the concept of an “administrative law of crime” to Morris and Hawkins in
their 1977 Letter to the President on Crime Control).
401. See, e.g., Rafael A. Mangual, The Criminal-Justice Reform No One’s Talking About,
MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/criminal-justicereform-no-ones-talking-about-10746.html [https://perma.cc/Q9WV-775Q] (condemning as
“overcriminalization” the vast number of regulatory crimes created by agencies rather than
Congress); Bench Ansfield, How a 50-Year-Old Study Was Misconstrued To Create Destructive
Broken-Windows Policing, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/out
look/2019/12/27/how-year-old-study-was-misconstrued-create-destructive-broken-windows-policing
[https://perma.cc/C2SM-U9XP] (citing the Movement for Black Lives as challenging “brokenwindows” policing of minor offenses as a racialized form of overpolicing of communities for little
public safety benefit).

